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While the Supreme Court approved of the use of charging threats nearly 
thirty years ago in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, a more recent line of cases has subtly 
undermined key premises of that landmark decision.  In order to induce guilty 
pleas, prosecutors might use any of a number of different tactics.  A prosecutor 
might, for instance, charge aggressively in the first instance and then promise to 
drop the most serious charges in return for a guilty plea to a lesser offense.  
Bordenkircher addressed the mirror-image of this tactic: the prosecutor filed 
relatively minor charges at first, but then threatened to pursue more serious 
charges if the defendant did not plead guilty. The Supreme Court approved of 
such charging threats based on two considerations: the efficiency benefits of 
resolving cases by plea instead of jury trial, and the possibility that prosecutors 
would evade a ban on threats by charging more aggressively in the first instance.  
The Court’s reasoning, however, is inconsistent with Apprendi v. New Jersey 
and its progeny.  Apprendi rejected the use of both efficiency considerations and 
evasion concerns as grounds for impairing access to juries. Apprendi instead 
emphasized a need for robust checks and balances within the criminal justice 
system.  Because the Apprendi line of cases addressed sentencing procedures, 
not plea bargaining, their relevance to Bordenkircher has thus far escaped 
notice.  The Article argues, however, that the Court should now overturn 
Bordenkircher in light of the values it embraced in Apprendi. The Article also 
proposes a new test for evaluating the constitutionality of charging threats. 
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It is an iconic case from the era when plea bargaining finally emerged from 
the shadows and acquired clear constitutional legitimacy.1 In 1973, a Kentucky 
grand jury indicted Paul Hayes on a charge of uttering a forged instrument in the 
amount of $88.30, an offense punishable by two to ten years in prison.2 During 
plea negotiations, the prosecutor offered to recommend a term of five years if 
Hayes pled guilty, but, otherwise, threatened to charge Hayes under the Kentucky 
Habitual Criminal Act, which would subject Hayes to a mandatory life term 
based on his two prior felony convictions.3 When Hayes rejected the deal, he 
was charged as threatened.4 Eventually, he lost at trial and was sentenced 
 
1 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (rejecting constitutional rule “that would 
drive the practice of plea bargaining back into the shadows from which it has so recently 
emerged”).  For a leading history of plea bargaining from its first systematic use in the nineteenth 
century to the present, see GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA 
BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003). 
2 Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 358. 
3 Id.
4 Id. at 359. 
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pursuant to the Act.5 Thus, for his decision to go to trial, Hayes suffered an 
extraordinary penalty, as his sentence ballooned from about five years to life.  
 The case, styled Bordenkircher v. Hayes, created a dilemma when it reached 
the Supreme Court.  On the one hand, as the Court had established in a recent 
line of cases, “[t]o punish a person because he has done what the law plainly 
allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort.”6 Because 
Hayes indisputably had a constitutional right to his jury trial, the prosecutor’s 
decision to penalize him in such a severe fashion for exercising the right was 
troubling at the very least.   
 On the other hand, in another recent line of cases, the Court had endorsed the 
guilty plea and plea bargain as “important components of this country’s criminal 
justice system.”7 A ruling in favor of Hayes might bring down the whole edifice.  
The Court could see no principled means of distinguishing among plea 
inducements: a “threat” (like the prosecutor’s threat to charge Hayes as a 
recidivist) could easily be restructured as an “offer” (e.g., the prosecutor might 
have charged Hayes as a recidivist from the outset and then offered to dismiss the 
charge if Hayes pled guilty to the underlying offense).  Thus, if the Court were to 
prohibit charging threats, the Court could not stop there, but would have to 
regulate all plea inducements—a radical step the Court was unwilling to make.8
Accordingly, the Court rejected Hayes’ claim.9
But is it really so hard to distinguish threats from offers?  Although its 
potential connections to Bordenkircher have thus far escaped notice, a much 
more recent line of cases casts doubt on crucial premises of the earlier decision.  
Since 2000, Apprendi v. New Jersey10 and its progeny11 have rejuvenated the 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.  Even though these decisions dealt with 
sentencing procedures, not plea bargaining, they have nonetheless undercut 
Bordenkircher in at least two respects.  First, and most obviously, Apprendi’s 
vision of a robust role for the jury in the criminal justice system is inconsistent 
 
5 Id.
6 Id. at 363 (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 738 (1969)). 
7 Id. at 361 (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977)). 
8 See id. at 364 (“While confronting a defendant with the risk more severe punishment clearly may 
have a discouraging effect on the defendant’s assertion of his trial rights, the imposition of these 
difficult choices is an inevitable—and permissible—attribute of any system which tolerates and 
encourages the negotiation of pleas.” (quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted)). 
9 Id. at 365. 
10 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
11 See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 
(2004). 
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with Bordenkircher’s endorsement of guilty pleas as the most desirable method 
of resolving criminal cases.  Second, and more subtly, the Apprendi decisions 
recognize the significance of the form of a government action.  Two different 
government actions producing the same result may be perceived quite differently 
based on differences in their form.  The Court’s reasoning in this regard, which 
resonates with recent work in cognitive psychology, points the way to a 
principled distinction between threats and offers.  
 Building on these observations, the central thesis of this Article is easily 
stated: in the interests of jurisprudential consistency, the five Justices constituting 
the majority in Apprendi—all of whom remain on the new Roberts Court—
should, if given the opportunity, vote to overturn Bordenkircher.12 The thesis is 
considerably easier to state than to defend—if for no other reason than that the 
only member of the “Apprendi Five” who was on the Court in 1978 (Justice 
Stevens) actually voted with the majority in Bordenkircher. Yet, as we will see, 
Stevens subtly backed away from Bordenkircher in a later opinion,13 and good 
arguments may be made that he should now reject even his watered-down 
version of Bordenkircher as inconsistent with his Apprendi writings. 
 In order to make these arguments, we shall have to puzzle over one the 
ongoing points of controversy surrounding the Apprendi decisions: whether they 
constitute, as Justice O’Connor dismissively characterized them, “doctrinaire 
formalism.”14 The question has attracted a growing body of scholarly 
commentary.15 I will attempt to illuminate the issues by distinguishing between 
 
12 While I argue that the Court ought to reject one particular form of plea inducement, I do not seek 
in this Article to join the long-standing academic debate over the merits of plea-bargaining 
generally.  See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: 
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 932-34 (1983) (summarizing 
arguments against plea bargaining); Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market 
System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 309 (1983) (“[P]lea bargaining is desirable, not just defensible, if 
the system attempts to maximize deterrence from a given commitment of resources.”); Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L. J. 1979, 1979 (1992) (“[P]lea bargaining 
seriously impairs the public interest in effective punishment of crime and in accurate separation of 
the guilty from the innocent.”); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract,
101 YALE L. J. 1909, 1910 (1992) (“Properly understood, classical contract theory supports the 
freedom to bargain over criminal punishment.”). 
13 United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982). 
14 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 321 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
15 Most commentators on this issue have echoed O’Connor’s criticism.  See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & 
Ethan A. Hastert, From Winship to Apprendi to Booker: Constitutional Command or Constitutional 
Blunder?, 58 STAN. L. REV. 195, 202 (2005) (“To the extent what emerges from the [Apprendi]
cases is something other than drafting advice, it will most likely redound to the detriment of 
defendants, a curious result in a line of cases ostensibly designed to protect defendants’ rights.”); 
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two types of formalism and two types of consequentialism.  First, I distinguish 
“rule-structure formalism” from “consequence-indifference formalism.”  The 
former principle indicates that, in establishing the boundaries of legal rights and 
duties, courts ought to favor bright-line tests over vague standards.16 The latter 
indicates that courts ought to decide cases based on some facially neutral 
principle, like plain textual meaning or original intent, without regard to the real-
world consequences of the decision.  It is this type of formalism that Justice 
O’Connor had in mind with her criticism of Apprendi. However, while the 
Apprendi Five undoubtedly employ rule-structure formalism, and also sometimes 
don the mantle of originalism, they just as clearly believe they are doing 
something that materially enhances the fairness and democratic accountability of 
the criminal justice system.  And because these beliefs are at least plausible, the 
Apprendi decisions should not be dismissed as indifferent to consequences. 
 I further distinguish between “rational-actor consequentialism” and “biased-
actor consequentialism.”  Any attempt to consider real-world consequences in 
judicial decision-making must rely on some basic assumptions about the way that 
people behave in the real world.  Law and economics scholars have long 
employed rational-actor models to predict the social consequences of changes in 
legal rules.  These models assume that people seek to maximize their utility from 
a stable set of preferences and accumulate an optimal amount of information in 
order to do so.17 A competing approach, sometimes labeled behavioral law and 
economics (“BLE”), relaxes these assumptions and attempts to take into account 
how “‘real people’ differ from homo economicus.”18 Of particular note, the “real 
 
Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice 
Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 186 (2005) (“[Justice 
Scalia] has done a disservice in Blakely . . . by exalting formalism so far above humility, 
practicality, and plain old common sense.”); Frank O. Bowman, III, Function Over Formalism: A 
Provisional Theory of the Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment, 17 FED. SENT’ING RPTR. 1, 
2 (2004) (criticizing “narrow formalism” of Blakely); Susan N. Herman, Applying Apprendi to the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: You Say You Want a Revolution?, 87 IOWA L. REV. 615, 638 
(2002) (characterizing Apprendi as “highly formalistic”); Jeffrey Standen, The End of the Era of 
Sentencing Guidelines, 87 IOWA L. REV. 775, 783 (2002) (“[T]he Court will not be able, through 
formalistic attacks from the fringe, to diminish the preeminent discretion of the legislature to define 
crimes.”).  For a more positive view, see Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 
VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1486 (2001) (“[T]he formalism of Apprendi is not pointless after all.”). 
16 See Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 749, 755 (2006) (contrasting rules and standards). 
17 Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476 (1998) (citing GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC 
APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976)). 
18 Id.
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people” of BLE exhibit various forms of cognitive bias, such as loss aversion, 
that is, the tendency to weigh losses more heavily than gains.19 
As we will see, the consequentialism of the Bordenkircher majority rests on 
rational-actor assumptions, while the Bordenkircher dissenters implicitly assume 
biased actors.  In the Apprendi decisions, these roles are reversed: the majority 
employs biased-actor consequentialism, while the dissenters adhere to the 
rational-actor model.  These different premises are not acknowledged in any of 
the cases, but they are readily teased out and help to explain how it is that all of 
the Justices seem to be claiming the consequentialist high ground. 
 The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I elaborates on the Bordenkircher 
dilemma, identifying the competing approaches to resolving the dilemma taken 
by the various majority and dissenting opinions in Bordenkircher and an 
important follow-up case, United States v. Goodwin.20 Part II discusses a parallel 
dilemma addressed by the Apprendi line of cases: to what extent should the Court 
defer to legislative decisions about which facts in a criminal case are “elements” 
(the determination of which implicates the full range of criminal procedure 
protections) and which facts are mere sentencing considerations (as to which 
procedures may be far more relaxed)?  Countering Justice O’Connor’s charge of 
“doctrinaire formalism,” this Part offers a consequentialist account of the 
Apprendi line of cases, in which they can be seen through the lens of BLE as 
advancing democratic, libertarian, and fairness values in the criminal justice 
system.  Part III brings together the Bordenkircher and Apprendi lines of cases, 
detailing their inconsistencies.  Part IV proposes a new rule of constitutional law 
that the Apprendi Five should adopt if given a fresh opportunity to address the 
issue of prosecutorial charging threats.  The test is consistent with the rule-
strucuture formalism of Apprendi, while also taking more seriously the jury-trial 
right than the rules adopted in Bordenkircher and Goodwin.
I. THE BORDENKIRCHER DILEMMA 
Prosecutors often seek to induce guilty pleas by offering defendants a benefit 
in return for their plea, such as the dismissal of one charge in exchange for a plea 
to a lesser-included offense.  Bordenkircher, though, involved a different sort of 
inducement: a threat to bring a greater charge.  The case presented a dilemma for 
the Court because it represented a collision between two established principles.  
On the one hand, the “vindictiveness” principle, adopted by the Court in such 
 
19 Id. at 1484.   
20 457 U.S. 368 (1982). 
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cases as Blackledge v. Perry,21 forbade prosecutors and judges from penalizing 
defendants for the exercise of procedural rights.  But, on the other hand, the 
Court had also recently come to recognize the important social benefits of guilty 
pleas and plea-bargaining, which facilitated the efficient resolution of cases and 
created opportunities for defendants to receive more lenient treatment.22 
To be more specific, the Bordenkircher dilemma involved at least three 
difficult, overlapping questions.  First, should the law distinguish between threats 
of harsh treatment and offers of lenient treatment when, at least in principle, 
threats could be easily restructured as offers?  Second, how much weight should 
be given to the social benefits of the plea-inducement system?  (This question 
was especially pressing if threats were indistinguishable from offers, in which 
case Paul Hayes’s claim might call into question all forms of plea inducement.)  
And, third, if defendants did have some sort of constitutional protection from 
unduly coercive plea inducements, how exactly would the right be structured? 
 The three opinions in Bordenkircher (a majority opinion by Justice Stewart 
and dissents by Justices Blackmun and Powell) suggest three different ways to 
resolve the tripartite dilemma.  This Part considers each of the opinions, then 
assesses the majority and dissenting opinions in Goodwin. Although Goodwin 
did not involve a prosecutorial charging threat, the opinions nonetheless 
addressed the meaning of Bordenkircher at some length.  Indeed, the Goodwin 
majority opinion (authored by Justice Stevens, a member of the Apprendi Five) 
characterized Bordenkircher in terms that were startlingly similar to Justice 
Powell’s dissent in the earlier case.  Meanwhile, Justice Brennan’s dissent in 
Goodwin suggests a fourth approach to resolving the Bordenkircher dilemma—
the one that turns out to be the closest in spirit to the Apprendi decisions. 
A. Bordenkircher 
1. Majority Opinion: A Rule of Non-Interference With Plea Inducements 
 In the majority’s view, Bordenkircher’s outcome resulted inevitably from the 
social desirability of plea inducements.  The majority saw no meaningful 
distinction between threats and offers,23 and so framed Hayes’ argument as an 
attack on plea inducements generally.24 Observing that “the guilty plea and the 
 
21 417 U.S. 21 (1974). 
22 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 361 (1978) (discussing benefits of plea-bargaining). 
23 Id. at 363. 
24 See id. at 364-65 (“To hold that the prosecutors’ desire to induce a guilty plea is an unjustifiable 
standard, which . . .may play no part in his charging decision, would contradict the very premises 
that underlie the concept of plea-bargaining itself.”). 
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often concomitant plea bargain are important components of this country’s 
criminal justice system,”25 the majority could find no fault in a prosecutor’s 
desire to secure a plea using his broad charging discretion,26 so long as the 
minimal requirements of probable cause were satisfied.27 The majority 
acknowledged that the threat of more severe punishment “may have a 
discouraging effect on the defendant’s assertion of his trial rights,” but 
nonetheless concluded that “the imposition of these difficult choices [is] an 
inevitable—and permissible—attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates 
and encourages the negotiation of pleas.”28 The majority thus suggested no 
circumstances in which a prosecutor’s filing of otherwise permissible charges 
pursuant to a plea-inducement threat would raise constitutional problems. 
2. Blackmun’s Dissent: Questioning the Legitimacy of the Plea-Inducement 
Motive 
 Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, found the 
vindictiveness principle controlling.  Notwithstanding the unquestioned social 
benefits of guilty pleas, Blackmun argued that it was unconstitutional for a 
prosecutor purposely to impose a penalty on a defendant as a result of the 
defendant’s decision to contest the prosecutor’s case at trial.29 In order to protect 
defendants from vindictiveness, he proposed a burden-shifting test that focused 
on the prosecutor’s intent: 
[W]hen plea negotiations, conducted in the face of the less serious charge 
under the first indictment, fail, charging by a second indictment a more 
serious crime for the same conduct creates a ‘strong inference’ of 
vindictiveness. . . . I . . . do not understand why . . . due process does not 
require that the prosecution justify its action on some basis other than 
discouraging [the defendant] from the exercise of his right to a trial.30 
25 Id. at 361. 
26 See id. at 364 (“[B]y tolerating and encouraging the negotiation of pleas, this Court has 
necessarily accepted as constitutionally legitimate the simple reality that the prosecutor’s interest at 
the bargaining table is to persuade the defendant to forgo his right to plead not guilty.”). 
27 See id. (“[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an 
offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring 
before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”). 
28 Id. at 364. 
29 Id. at 367 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
30 Id.
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Blackmun recognized that his approach might cause prosecutors to 
restructure threats as offers.31 In other words, rather than employ a “low-to-high” 
charging strategy, some prosecutors might switch to “high-to-low.”  Blackmun 
further recognized that judges would not be able to detect and sanction such 
“overcharging.”32 Yet, Blackmun believed it was preferable for prosecutors to 
employ high-to-low rather than low-to-high; the switch would protect those 
defendants who were most determined to go to trial from the most severe 
reprisals, facilitate public oversight of plea-inducement practices, and give 
defendants a fairer chance to challenge the enhanced charges.33 Blackmun, in 
short, concluded that there were meaningful differences between threats and 
offers.  (His analysis will be discussed in more detail in Part III below.) 
3. Powell’s Dissent: Deference With a Difference 
 Justice Powell staked out the middle ground.  On the one hand, he agreed 
with the majority that plea inducements are “essential to the functioning of the 
criminal justice system,” and that, in general, prosecutors should be “accorded 
the widest discretion” in attempting to secure pleas.34 He was unwilling, 
however, to endorse the majority’s view that prosecutors had an entirely free 
hand to enhance charges in response to a defendant’s failure to plead guilty.  At 
some point, the new charge might become “unreasonable and not in the public 
interest,”35 and it was at that point that Powell would join Blackmun in 
condemning the prosecutor’s motives.  Put differently, the prosecutor’s desire to 
penalize the exercise of trial rights was immaterial as long as the resulting 
charges were also justified by society’s legitimate interest in punishing the 
defendant’s underlying criminal conduct; however, “[i]mplementation of a 
strategy calculated solely to deter the exercise of constitutional rights is not a 
constitutionally permissible exercise of discretion.”36 
Powell thus proposed a test that focused not on whether the prosecutor 
wished to penalize the defendant’s exercise of a right, but on “whether the 
prosecutor reasonably might have charged the [defendant with the new crime] in 
the first place.”37 On the unique facts of Bordenkircher, where the defendant was 
subject to a life sentence for an $88 crime, Powell concluded that the charges 
 
31 Id. at 368 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
32 Id. at 368 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
33 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
34 Id. at 672-73 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
35 Id. at 371 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
36 Id. at 373 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
37 Id. at 370 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
10 RECONSIDERING BORDENKIRCHER 
were not reasonable.38 Thus, while Powell’s approach was more deferential to 
prosecutors than Blackmun’s, Powell would have imposed some limitations on 
prosecutors in “exceptional case[s].”39 
B. Goodwin 
 Following an altercation with a police officer, Learley Reed Goodwin was 
charged with several misdemeanor and petty offenses.40 After plea negotiations 
failed, the case was transferred to another prosecutor, who obtained a felony 
indictment, thus exposing Goodwin to more severe punishment.41 Convicted at 
trial, Goodwin argued on appeal that prosecutors had unconstitutionally retaliated 
against him for invoking his right to a jury trial.42 The claim, however, was 
rejected by the Supreme Court. 
 Although Goodwin did not arise from an express threat, the case merits our 
attention for two reasons.  First, because the Court’s analysis turned on the scope 
of the Bordenkircher exception to prior vindictiveness law, Goodwin contains 
much commentary on the earlier decision.  Second, the Goodwin majority 
opinion was authored by Justice Stevens, who later became a key figure in the 
Apprendi cases.  Before turning to the majority opinion, though, we will begin 
with the dissent, authored by Justice Brennan and joined by Justice Marshall, 
which suggests a fourth distinct approach to vindictiveness. 
1. Brennan’s Dissent: The Likelihood-of-Deterrence Test 
 In Brennan’s view, Bordenkircher was limited to its particular circumstances, 
a prosecutor carrying through on a threat made during plea negotiations.43 
Outside that context, vindictiveness analysis turned on the questions considered 
by the pre-Bordenkircher vindictiveness cases: “Did the elevation of the charges 
against [the defendant] pose a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness?  Is it possible 
that the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a person in [the 
defendant’s] position from exercising his statutory and constitutional right to a 
jury trial?”44 And, as Brennan saw it, the government’s elevation of charges 
against Goodwin did indeed pose such “a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness.”45 
38 Id. at 370-71 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
39 Id. at 372 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
40 United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 370 (1982). 
41 Id.
42 Id. at 372. 
43 Id. at 391 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
44 Id. at 389-90 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
45 Id. at 390 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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Thus, under Brennan’s test, the analysis depended not on the prosecutor’s 
actual motive, but, rather, on how the prosecutor’s actions might realistically be 
viewed by a defendant.46 Even though Brennan had joined Blackmun’s dissent in 
Bordenkircher, his opinion in Goodwin actually went a step further, inasmuch as 
Blackmun would have given the prosecutor an opportunity to rebut a 
presumption of vindictiveness by showing an absence of actual vindictive intent.  
(Indeed, as if to underscore the point, Blackmun did not join Brennan’s dissent in 
Goodwin, but wrote a concurring opinion.47) In Part IV, I will discuss how 
Brennan’s approach might be translated into the express threat setting. 
2. Majority Opinion: Powell’s Triumph? 
 The majority relied on Bordenkircher in rejecting Goodwin’s claim, but, in 
doing so, confronted an important difficulty: while Bordenkircher turned on a 
perceived need to preserve the plea-inducement system, Goodwin’s claim 
presented no direct challenge to the system.  Justice Stevens’s solution was to 
recharacterize Bordenkircher, not as a case about the benefits of plea 
inducements, but as a case about the benefits of broad prosecutorial charging 
discretion.  That maneuver addressed one difficulty, but opened another: how to 
account for Blackledge v. Perry, the leading pre-Bordenkircher case on 
prosecutorial vindictiveness, in which the Court had rejected a prosecutor’s 
enhancement of charges following a defendant’s exercise of his right to a 
retrial.48 In light of Blackledge, charging discretion was clearly not unlimited.  In 
order to harmonize Blackledge with his take on Bordenkircher, Stevens borrowed 
a little from Blackmun’s dissent in Bordenkircher and a lot from Powell’s.  
Lending support to this view of Goodwin, Powell (alone among the four 
Bordenkircher dissenters) actually joined the majority opinion. 
 Stevens endorsed the constitutional principle on which Blackledge was based 
(an individual “may not be punished for exercising a protected statutory or 
constitutional right”49), but saw the real difficulty as one of proof.  How could the 
courts distinguish between “governmental action that is fully justified as a 
legitimate response to perceived criminal conduct” and “governmental action that 
 
46 See id. at 389 (arguing that Blackledge “focused upon the accused’s apprehension of . . . 
retaliatory motivation”).  
47 Blackmun disagreed with the majority’s approach, but would have nonetheless affirmed the 
conviction on the basis that the prosecutor had “dispelled the appearance of vindictiveness” in the 
case.  Id. at 386 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). 
48 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1974). 
49 Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 372. 
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is an impermissible response to noncriminal, protected activity”50? This is where 
Stevens borrowed from Blackmun, specifically, by structuring the regulation of 
prosecutorial discretion through a system of presumptions and burden-shifting.  
Thus, Blackledge, in Stevens’s account, had established a rebuttable presumption 
of vindictiveness based on increased charges in its particular post-trial setting.51 
In Bordenkircher, by contrast, “the Court for the first time considered an 
allegation of vindictiveness that arose in a pretrial setting,”52 and “made clear 
that the mere fact that a defendant refuses to plead guilty and forces the 
government to prove its case is insufficient to warrant a presumption that 
subsequent changes in the charging decision are unjustified.”53 Stevens felt that 
prosecutors could generally be trusted to charge reasonably and without an 
improper motive to punish or deter the exercise of procedural rights: 
There is good reason to be cautious before adopting an inflexible 
presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting.  In the 
course of preparing a case for trial, the prosecutor may uncover 
additional information that suggests a basis for further prosecution or he 
simply may come to realize that information possessed by the State has a 
broader significance. . . . 
. . . A prosecutor should remain free before trial to exercise the broad 
discretion entrusted to him to determine the extent of the societal interest 
in prosecution. . . . 54 
Stevens thus indicated that the key difference between Blackledge and 
Bordenkircher was not the plea-inducement context (as the dissenters asserted), 
but their post-trial versus pretrial settings.  Vindictiveness might be presumed in 
at least some post-trial contexts, but it would never be presumed where charges 
were increased pretrial. 
 Stevens’s reluctance, like Powell’s, to presume that prosecutors act with 
improper motives differentiates his approach from Blackmun’s.  (And the focus 
of all three on prosecutorial motivation, as opposed to defendant apprehension, 
differentiates their approaches from Brennan’s.)  At the same time, there are real 
differences (albeit subtle and unacknowledged) between Stevens’s opinion for 
the Court in Goodwin and Stewart’s opinion for the Court in Bordenkircher. In 
 
50 Id.
51 Id. at 376. 
52 Id. at 377 (emphasis added). 
53 Id. at 382-83. 
54 Id. at 381-82. 
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particular, Bordenkircher recognized no apparent limitation on the prosecutor’s 
discretion in pressuring defendants to plead guilty; as long as the charge is 
supported by probable cause, the prosecutor can use it.  (Indeed, as Powell had 
suggested, it is hard to imagine a much clearer case of actual vindictiveness than 
Bordenkircher itself, in which the prosecutor sought a life sentence for an $88 
crime and made quite clear that he did so as a result of Hayes’ refusal to plead 
guilty to the lesser crime.)  By contrast, Goodwin stated, 
In declining to apply a presumption of vindictiveness, we of course do 
not foreclose the possibility that a defendant in an appropriate case might 
prove objectively that the prosecutor’s charging decision was motivated 
by a desire to punish him for doing something that the law plainly allows 
him to do.55 
How might this improper motivation be proven in the absence of a 
presumption?  According to Goodwin, Bordenkircher established that the 
prosecutor’s stated intent to induce a guilty plea was not enough: 
The fact that the prosecutor threatened the defendant did not prove that 
the action threatened was not permissible; the prosecutor’s conduct did 
not establish that the additional charges were brought solely to 
“penalize” the defendant and could not be justified as a proper exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion.56 
Put differently, “mixed motives” were inadequate: “A charging decision does not 
levy an improper ‘penalty’ unless it results solely from the defendant’s exercise 
of a protected legal right, rather than the prosecutor’s normal assessment of the 
societal interest in prosecution.”57 Thus, the burden on the defendant was not to 
show an intent to induce a guilty plea, but to show an intent to induce a guilty 
plea using charges that “could not be justified as a proper exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion.”58 Goodwin thus contemplated that vindictiveness 
claims would be built around a showing that charges exceeded “the extent of the 
societal interest in prosecution.”59 This is, of course, precisely the inquiry that 
Powell advocated in his Bordenkircher dissent.  Little wonder that he parted 
ways with his fellow Bordenkircher dissenters to join the Goodwin majority! 
 
55 Id. at 384. 
56 Id. at 380 n.12. 
57 Id. at 380 n.11 (emphasis added; citation omitted). 
58 Id. at 380 n.12 (emphasis added). 
59 Id. at 382. 
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C. Summary 
 While Goodwin may have muddied the waters a bit, it is still perfectly clear 
that a defendant who is penalized, like Paul Hayes, pursuant to a plea-inducement 
threat has little or no chance of prevailing on a vindictiveness claim.  Nothing in 
Goodwin suggested that Bordenkircher was incorrectly decided on its facts, and 
few defendants will have facts nearly as compelling as those of Hayes himself.  
Moreover, to whatever extent that Powell’s slightly more flexible approach 
ultimately prevailed, recall that Powell made clear that judicial interference in the 
plea-inducement process should occur “[o]nly in the most exceptional case.”60 
Bordenkircher and Goodwin both relied on consequentialist reasoning.  
Neither, for instance, engaged in any textual exegesis or assessment of original 
intent.  Rather, Bordenkircher worried about preserving the benefits offered by 
the plea-inducement system to defendants and the public at large, while Goodwin 
worried about preserving the prosecutor’s “free[dom] before trial to exercise the 
broad discretion entrusted to him to determine the extent of the societal interest 
in prosecution.”61 In light of their respective consequentialist concerns, both 
cases mandated a high degree of deference to prosecutorial charging decisions. 
 Bordenkircher, adopting a somewhat stronger form of deference, employed a 
bright-line rule: as long as the charge was supported by probable cause, there was 
no vindictiveness problem.  Goodwin, by contrast, seemed less consistent with 
the ideal of rule-structure formalism, suggesting an inquiry (could the charges 
“be justified as a proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion?”) that implied 
prudential, case-by-case balancing of interests.  As we will see, the Court initially 
adopted, but then decisively rejected, just this sort of rule as it wrestled with the 
sentencing factor problem. 
II. A PARALLEL DILEMMA: ELEMENTS VERSUS SENTENCING FACTORS 
Prior to the 1980’s, sentencing in the United States was largely discretionary: 
after a defendant was convicted of a crime, the judge was free to select a sentence 
anywhere within a wide statutory range prescribed for the crime.62 The two- to 
 
60 Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 372 (Powell, J. dissenting). 
61 457 U.S. at 382. 
62 See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 225-26 (1993) (describing 
traditional federal sentencing practices).  I use the term “discretionary sentencing” throughout this 
Article in order to avoid confusion surrounding the more common term “indeterminate sentencing.”  
See Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L. J. 377, 381-86 (2005) 
(discussing terminological difficulties in this area).  The latter term is sometimes applied broadly to 
any sentencing regime in which judges select sentences within wide ranges, and sometimes more 
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ten-year range Paul Hayes initially faced for false uttering in 1973 was 
emblematic of such a discretionary system.  By contrast, the Kentucky Habitual 
Criminal Act, with its mandatory life sentence for certain recidivists, was 
aberrational; indeed, Kentucky actually softened the Act while Hayes’ case was 
pending63—too late to do Hayes any good, but indicative of the times.   
 Since the 1970’s, however, American legislatures have adopted a host of 
mandatory minimum statutes, binding sentencing guidelines, and other 
presumptive sentencing schemes in order to curtail the discretion of sentencing 
judges.64 In such regimes, the sentence is largely dictated by the presence of 
some fact or group of facts that go beyond what is necessary to establish the 
defendant’s legal guilt.  For instance, under the Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act, 
the presence of two prior felony convictions mandated a life sentence.  In some 
mandatory sentencing regimes, the critical facts must be found by a jury beyond 
a reasonable doubt,65 but in others the legislature contemplates judicial fact-
finding using the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.   
 Although the latter procedures may be more efficient and reliable, they have 
also spawned important constitutional objections.  These objections parallel the 
 
narrowly to apply only to systems in which a parole board determines the actual release date from 
prison.  “Discretionary sentencing” in this Article corresponds to the broader understanding of 
“indeterminate sentencing.”  The term encompasses not only traditional unguided sentencing 
systems, but also systems with “advisory” (i.e., nonbinding) sentencing guidelines.  See Kim S. 
Hunt & Michael Connelly, Advisory Guidelines in the Post-Blakely Era, 17 FED. SENT’ING RPTR.
233, 233 (2005) (noting that nine states and the District of Columbia employ advisory guidelines).  
By contrast, six states and the federal government had “mandatory” sentencing guidelines prior to 
the recent Apprendi line of cases.  See id. at 239 n.3. 
63 Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 359 n.2. 
64 For a more detailed description of this history and explanation of the trend, see O’Hear, supra 
note 16, at 756-91.  Presumptive sentencing schemes mandate a particular sentence or narrow 
sentencing range, often based on detailed sentencing guidelines that take into account a variety of 
offense and offender characteristics; judges must impose the presumptive sentence (or sentence 
within the presumptive range) unless particular aggravating or mitigating facts warrant a different 
result.  Prior to the Apprendi decisions, thirteen states and the federal government employed 
presumptive sentencing.  Don Stemen & Daniel F. Wilhelm, Finding the Jury: State Legislative 
Responses to Blakely v. Washington, 18 FED. SENT’ING RPTR. 7, 7 (2005).  Presumptive sentencing 
schemes (with or without guidelines) may be contrasted with discretionary schemes.  See supra 
note 62.  Note one final distinction: if a legislature wishes to single out a particular type of offense 
or offender for special condemnation (in either a discretionary or presumptive system), the 
legislature might increase the applicable maximum sentence, in lieu of (or in addition to) increasing 
the minimum. Both sorts of increases will be referred to here as “sentence enhancements,” 
although their operation differs in at least one important respect: an increased maximum enhances 
the scope of the sentencer’s discretion, while an increased minimum diminishes discretion. 
65 Bordenkircher., 434 U.S. at 359. 
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issues raised by the use of charging threats to induce guilty pleas.  On the one 
hand, both practices curtail the availability to defendants of basic jury trial 
protections in the determination of the facts on which their punishment depends.  
On the other hand, judicial regulation of these practices would run counter to 
traditional doctrines of deference to coordinate branches of government.  At issue 
in Bordenkircher was the tradition of judicial deference to prosecutorial charging 
decisions.  In the sentencing context, the issue was judicial deference to the 
legislative determination of crime elements. 
 The Court confronted these sentencing issues for the first time in 1986 in 
McMillan v. Pennsylvania.66 Although Apprendi later repudiated much of 
McMillan, the earlier case remains a good starting point for this Part, both 
because it illuminates the significance of Apprendi and because, with the same 
line-up of Justices as in Goodwin, it also sheds light on the relationship between 
the vindictiveness cases and the sentencing cases.  (The line-up of Justices is set 
forth in Table 1.)  After considering McMillan, I summarize the later Apprendi 
cases and describe how exactly they are formalist and how consequentialist. 
 
Table 1.  Break-Down of Votes in Goodwin, McMillan, and Apprendi 
(Current sitting Justices are indicated in bold; M=majority; D=dissent; C=concurrence 
in judgment only; N/A=not on Court).  
 Goodwin McMillan Apprendi 
Stevens M D M
Burger M M N/A 
O’Connor M M D 
Powell M M N/A 
Rehnquist M M D 
White M M N/A 
Blackmun C D N/A 
Brennan D D N/A 
Marshall D D N/A 
Ginsburg N/A N/A M 
Scalia N/A N/A M 
Souter N/A N/A M 
Thomas N/A N/A M 
Breyer N/A N/A D 
Kennedy N/A N/A D 
66 477 U.S. 79 (1986). 
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A. McMillan: Taking the Powell Approach Again 
 In 1982, Pennsylvania adopted its Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act, 
which provided that anyone who committed one of a list of serious felonies 
would be subject to a mandatory minimum prison sentence of five years if the 
sentencing judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the person 
“visibly possessed a firearm during the commission of the offense.”67 Dynel 
McMillan and other defendants challenged the Act’s constitutionality, arguing 
that it violated the requirement that all elements of a crime be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt,68 as mandated by In re Winship.69 These claims were 
ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court.70 
Decided just four years after Goodwin by a Court that was comprised of the 
same nine justices, it should not be surprising that McMillan reflected a similar 
jurisprudential dynamic as the earlier case.  Indeed, each of the five members of 
the McMillan majority was also part of the Goodwin majority, while both of the 
Goodwin dissenters also dissented in McMillan. Thus, only two justices 
“switched” in McMillan, and one of those (Blackmun) made just the small step 
from a concurrence in judgment to outright dissent.  That leaves just one justice 
(Stevens) making a sharp break in alignment from Goodwin to McMillan.
Fortunately, Stevens authored a lengthy dissent in the later case, which offers 
some clues as to why he “flipped.” 
 First, however, consider Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion.  Powell joined 
the opinion without comment, and it does indeed echo major themes from both 
his Bordenkircher dissent and the Goodwin majority opinion.  Much as the 
earlier opinions emphasized judicial deference towards prosecutors, McMillan 
emphasized deference towards state legislatures.71 But just as the earlier 
opinions declined to make deference absolute, McMillan also indicated “there are 
constitutional limits to the State’s power in this regard.”72 McMillan sought a 
middle ground—just like Powell in Bordenkircher—between rejecting judicial 
 
67 Id. at 81. 
68 Id. at 82-83. 
69 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
70 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 82. 
71 The Court put it this way: “[I]n determining what facts must be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt the state legislature’s definition of the elements of the offense is usually dispositive . . . . 
[W]e should not lightly construe the Constitution so as intrude upon the administration of justice by 
the individual States.”  Id. at 85. 
72 Id. at 86. 
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review altogether and imposing rigid, formal constraints that might unduly 
burden state crime-control efforts.   
 The Court thus declined to articulate a “bright line test,”73 but, instead, 
identified several potentially relevant considerations.  Most notably, the Court 
suggested the tail-wagging-the-dog test, asking whether the sentencing factor 
(here, visible possession of a firearm) really dominated the sentencing calculus.74 
For instance, as to the Pennsylvania Act, because the predicate felonies all 
involved maximum sentences in excess of five years, the Act’s new five-year 
mandatory minimum did not amount to a tail wagging a dog: the Act “operates 
solely to limit the sentencing court’s discretion in selecting a penalty already 
available to it without the special finding of visible possession of a firearm.”75 
This McMillan test was reminiscent of Powell’s proposed test in Bordenkircher,
which could be recast in similar terms: Was the state’s effort to induce a guilty 
plea (the tail) “wagging” the state’s legitimate interest in punishment (the dog)? 
 With the majority opinion echoing the earlier Powell dissent, Blackmun, 
Brennan, and Marshall reprised their dissenting position from Bordenkircher.
Marshall, writing for the three, rejected the majority’s approach as overly 
deferential and basically endorsed the bright-line test proposed by Stevens.76 
Stevens, in his dissent, likewise rejected unlimited deference to the 
legislature.  “It would demean the importance of the reasonable-doubt standard,” 
he wrote, “if the substance of the standard could be avoided by nothing more 
than a legislative declaration that prohibited conduct is not an ‘element’ of a 
crime.”77 Fair enough, but no one in McMillan was advocating absolute 
deference.  The real question was the test to be used when a defendant asserted 
that a legislature had gone too far.  Stevens proposed the following: “[I]f a State 
provides that a specific component of a prohibited transaction shall give rise to a 
special stigma and a special punishment, that component must be treated as a 
‘fact necessary to constitute the crime’ within the meaning of our holding in 
Winship.”78 And Stevens had little difficulty concluding that the Pennsylvania 
 
73 Id. at 91. 
74 See id. at 88 (“The statute gives no impression of having been tailored to permit the visible 
possession finding to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.”). 
75 Id.
76 Id. at 93-94 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  Marshall declined to join Stevens’ opinion because he was 
not ready to commit to Stevens’ approach to mitigating facts.  Id at 94.   
77 Id. at 102 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
78 Id. at 103. 
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statute did, indeed, impose “special stigma” and “special punishment” based on 
the “specific component” of visible possession.79 
Stevens’s approach might be criticized as not merely insufficiently 
deferential to the state legislature, but also futile.  The problem lay in his per se 
distinction between aggravating and mitigating facts: while aggravating facts 
would always have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, no such standard 
applied to the disproof of mitigating.80 The rule invited legislative evasion: a 
state that was intent on minimizing prosecutorial burdens might simply convert 
aggravating factors into mitigating.  Stevens himself offered as an example 
a statute making presence in any private or public place a felony 
punishable by up to five years imprisonment and yet allowing an 
affirmative defense for the defendant to prove, to a preponderance of the 
evidence, that he was not robbing a bank.81 
This hypothetical echoed the prosecutorial evasion scenario that so troubled the 
Court in Bordenkircher and Goodwin (i.e., adopting an aggressive high-to-low 
charging strategy). 
 Stevens dismissed the evasion possibilities in this context, however, as 
unlikely in a democratic system.  “No democratically elected legislature would 
enact [the hypothetical] law, and if it did, a broad-based coalition of bankers and 
bank customers would soon see the legislation repealed.”82 The 
aggravating/mitigating distinction was thus explained by reference to the view 
that “constitutional law appropriately exists for those situations where 
representative government cannot be trusted, not those where we know it can.”83 
B. The Apprendi Canon: Stevens’s Triumph 
 Beginning with Jones v. United States84 in 1999, a majority of the Court 
signaled first its doubts about, and then its rejection of, the approach taken in 
McMillan. Five cases constitute what we may think of as the “Apprendi canon”: 
Jones, Apprendi, Ring v. Arizona,85 Blakely v. Washington,86 and United States v. 
 
79 Id.
80 Id. at 99. 
81 Id.  at 100. 
82 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 101 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
83 Id. at 101 n.5 (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 183 (1980)). 
84 526 U.S. 227 (1999). 
85 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
86 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
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Booker.87 In these cases—all but one vigorously contested 5-4 decisions—the 
Court adopted and extended the rule proposed by Justice Stevens in his McMillan 
dissent.  Indeed, Stevens himself authored the majority opinions in Apprendi and 
Booker. He was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas. 
 Technically, Jones presented a question of statutory, not constitutional, 
interpretation.  The federal carjacking statute at issue in the case provided a 
standard 15-year maximum sentence, but an enhanced 25-year maximum 
sentence if there had been “serious bodily injury.”88 The Court determined that 
this “serious bodily injury” prong of the statute should be regarded as an element 
of a separate, aggravated carjacking offense—thus triggering rights to jury fact-
finding beyond a reasonable doubt—rather than merely an additional factor for 
the judge to find at sentencing.89 The Court reached this interpretation, in part, 
because a contrary result would raise “grave and doubtful constitutional 
questions,” specifically, by increasing the defendant’s sentencing exposure on the 
basis of a fact not proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.90 As the 
dissenters recognized, the majority here embraced a more robust conception of 
jury-trial rights than had been apparent in the Court’s recent jurisprudence.91 
What was merely suggested as a constitutional question in Jones became a 
constitutional holding the following year in Apprendi. Charles C. Apprendi, Jr., 
pled guilty in New Jersey state court to three weapons violations.92 At 
sentencing, the judge determined that Apprendi had acted with a racially biased 
purpose, which, under the state hate crimes statute, increased the maximum 
possible sentence from twenty to thirty years.93 In ruling that this process had 
violated Apprendi’s constitutional rights, the Court limited the McMillan wag-
the-dog analysis to sentence enhancements at the bottom end of the sentencing 
range, i.e., fact-finding that triggers a mandatory minimum sentence.94 As to 
enhancements at the top end of the range, the Court adopted this bright-line rule: 
“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a 
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”95 The Court thus held that New Jersey’s 
 
87 543 U.S. 220 (2005).   
88 526 U.S. at 230. 
89 Id. at 232. 
90 Id. at 239. 
91 Id. at 272 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
92 530 U.S. at 469-70. 
93 Id. at 470. 
94 Id. at 487 n.13. 
95 Id. at 490. 
21 RECONSIDERING BORDENKIRCHER 
sentence enhancement procedure was “an unacceptable departure from the jury 
tradition that is an indispensable part of our criminal justice system.”96 
In Ring, the Court extended Apprendi to capital punishment, overturning a 
sentencing scheme in which a judge found the aggravating factors required to 
make a murder defendant eligible for death.97 The Court saw no good reason to 
distinguish Apprendi; if the jury-trial right encompassed the fact-finding 
necessary to increase a defendant’s sentencing exposure by ten years, then it 
must also encompass the fact-finding necessary to impose the death penalty.98 
In Blakely, the Court considered Apprendi’s applicability to sentencing 
guidelines.99 Sentencing guidelines prescribe a narrow sentencing range, within 
a broader statutory range, based on the presence or absence of specified factors.  
For instance, when Ralph Howard Blakely, Jr., pled guilty in Washington state 
court to second-degree kidnapping, he faced a broad statutory range of zero to ten 
years.100 Pursuant to state sentencing guidelines, however, Blakely’s offense 
triggered a “standard range” of 49 to 53 months,101 with the possibility of an 
above-range sentence if the judge found “substantial and compelling reasons 
justifying an exceptional sentence.”102 The judge made such a finding on the 
basis of his determination that Blakely acted with “deliberate cruelty,” and 
imposed a sentence of 90 months103—well above the high end of the standard 
range, but still well below the ten-year statutory maximum. 
 The Court nonetheless held that this process violated Apprendi, refining the 
Apprendi rule as follows: “When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury’s 
verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts which the law 
makes essential to the punishment, and the judge exceeds his proper 
authority.”104 Thus, because the judge in Blakely had imposed a sentence that 
would not have been legally permissible absent his finding of deliberate cruelty, 
the judge had violated the defendant’s right to a jury trial.105 
96 Id. at 497. 
97 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002). 
98 Id. at 609. 
99 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004). 
100 Id. at 299. 
101 Id. at 300. 
102 Id. at 299. 
103 Id. at 300. 
104 Id. at 303-04. 
105 Id. at 305. 
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In overturning Washington’s sentencing regime, Blakely also cast into doubt 
the mandatory guidelines systems employed in a number of other jurisdictions, 
including, perhaps most importantly, the federal sentencing guidelines.  In United 
States v. Booker, the Court finally addressed the federal system, and held that it, 
too, ran afoul of the Apprendi rule to the extent that it relied on judicial fact-
finding.106 Notably, however, the Apprendi Five fractured over the remedy for 
this constitutional violation.  Four of the five would have retained the mandatory 
character of the federal guidelines but required jury fact-finding for sentence 
enhancements.107 Ginsburg switched sides, though, to create a separate majority 
in favor of a different remedy: conversion of the guidelines from mandatory to 
advisory.108 Booker thus boasted two majority opinions, the “merits opinion” 
(joined by all members of the Apprendi Five) and the “remedy opinion” 
(authored by Justice Breyer and joined by Ginsburg and the merits dissenters). 
 The Booker remedy has not been the only occasion on which the Five have 
parted company.  Of greatest significance, Scalia joined the Apprendi dissenters 
in Harris v. United States to exempt mandatory minimums from the Apprendi 
rule.109 Thus, a judge may still find the facts necessary to trigger a mandatory 
minimum (as long as the minimum does not exceed the otherwise applicable 
maximum).  In effect, then, the Apprendi rule deals just with the defendant’s 
worst-case scenario: the rule is violated only if a judge’s fact-finding results in an 
increase in the maximum sentence that may be imposed. 
C. Apprendi’s Aims 
 In order to appreciate the inconsistencies between Bordenkircher and the 
Apprendi cases, we should begin by considering what exactly the Apprendi Five 
said they were up to: what vision purports to animate the extraordinary doctrinal 
changes they have embraced?  (To be sure, critics contend that the Five cannot 
 
106 543 U.S. 220, 226-27 (2005). 
107 Id. at 272-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); id. at 313 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part). 
108 Id. at 245.  It remains arguable whether the formal switch to “advisory” guidelines has rendered 
the federal system materially more discretionary, as appellate courts, exercising “reasonableness 
review” over post-Booker sentences, have proven quite reluctant to approve some of the more 
adventuresome departures from guidelines norms.  See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 434 F.3d 684 
(4th Cir. 2006) (overturning sentence where district court took into account federal-state sentencing 
disparity in imposing sentence below guidelines range); United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625 (4th 
Cir. 2006) (overturning sentence where district court attempted to mitigate the disparate treatment 
of crack and powder cocaine in guidelines); United States v. Galicia-Cardenas, 443 F.3d 553 (7th 
Cir. 2006) (overturning sentence where district court adjusted sentence so as to take into account 
lack of “fast-track” program in prosecuting United States Attorney’s Office). 
109 536 U.S. 545, 551-52 (2002). 
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really be serious about the vision they have articulated because there is a 
seemingly wide disconnect between that vision and the reality of the Apprendi 
rule they adopted.  I will address this criticism in the next Section.) 
 The Apprendi decisions represent a self-conscious choice in favor of the 
“common-law ideal” of jury trial over the “civil-law ideal of administrative 
perfection.”110 The decisions thus rejected a model of bureaucratized criminal 
justice, embodied by judicially administered sentencing guidelines, despite the 
model’s conceded advantages of efficiency and consistency.111 In lieu of these 
values, the Apprendi Five prioritized the following: (1) democratic control over 
the criminal justice system, (2) libertarian checks on state power, and (3) fairness 
to defendants.112 Let us consider each of these values in turn. 
1. Democratic Control 
 The Apprendi cases linked the jury to democratic values: “Just as suffrage 
ensures the people’s ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches, 
jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary.”113 At the same time, it 
might seem a bit odd for an (unelected) Supreme Court to strike down a host of 
legislatively adopted sentencing schemes in the name of democratic values.  Why 
not permit a politically accountable legislature to employ the most efficient 
means (i.e., judicial fact-finding) to implement its choices about how much 
weight to give to particular sentencing factors?   
 The Apprendi decisions suggest two responses.  First, legislative decisions 
regarding sentencing factors are necessarily somewhat crude; a legislature cannot 
hope to design a sentencing system that takes into account all of the complexity 
of the real world.  As a result, the literal application of any sentencing rule will 
inevitably produce some unduly harsh outcomes that are not truly consistent with 
public preferences.  Moreover, this disconnect between global legislative 
judgments and case-specific community preferences is likely exacerbated by the 
 
110 Id. at 313. 
111 See, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. at 607 (“Entrusting to a judge the finding of facts necessary to support 
a death sentence might be an admirably fair and efficient scheme of criminal justice designed for a 
society that is prepared to leave criminal justice to the State.”); Booker, 543 U.S. at 244 
(acknowledging that jury fact-finding “may impair the most expedient and efficient sentencing of 
defendants”). 
112 Jury fact-finding is also sometimes said to advance accuracy in adjudication.  I do not 
emphasize the point here because it does not play an important role in the Apprendi decisions.  The 
accuracy hypothesis, moreover, has at best weak support in the empirical scholarship.  Paul H. 
Robinson & Barbara A. Spellman, Sentencing Decisions: Matching the Decisionmaker to the 
Decision Nature, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1124, 1145 (2005). 
113 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306. 
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tendency, demonstrated in the social science literature, for people to make 
harsher judgments about crime in the abstract than when confronted with the 
facts of a particular case.114 Preserving a role for the jury at sentencing thus 
offers a second level of democratic control that may mitigate the structural 
weaknesses of the first.  Indeed, both Jones and Apprendi made note of the 
common-law tradition of “pious perjury,” whereby a jury might circumvent a 
harsh mandatory penalty that seemed disproportionate to the gravity of the 
offense.115 In a similar vein, a modern sentencing jury might decline to find an 
aggravating sentencing factor that was literally present in a case, but that would 
result in a sentence enhancement that, in the jury’s view, was unjust.116
Second, a sentencing jury might also advance democratic values in cases in 
which the legislature has structured a sentencing factor in a manner that requires 
a discretionary exercise of judgment.  Sentence enhancements are sometimes 
structured as bright-line rules; think, for instance, of the mandatory minimum in 
McMillan that was triggered by the visible possession of a firearm.  But 
sometimes legislatures employ more open-ended standards; think here of the 
system overturned in Blakely, in which the sentence might be enhanced if the 
judge found “substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional 
sentence.”  An enhancement of this nature effectively delegates considerable 
discretionary authority to the sentencer.  In such circumstances, where the 
legislature has left much undecided, we might find it particularly important that 
implementation of the standard include the participation of another actor with 
 
114 Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Implementing Blakely, 17 FED. SENT’ING RPTR. 106, 111 (2004). 
115 Jones, 526 U.S. at 245; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479 n.5. 
116 As discussed in the next Section, a sentencing judge might also function as a check on a 
prosecutor’s overly aggressive use (relative to public preferences) of sentence enhancements.  It is 
at least plausible, however, that a judge, schooled in rule-of-law norms and subject to appellate 
review, would be less likely than a jury to function as a check in the circumstances contemplated 
here, i.e., de facto nullification of the enhancement.  This view resonates with Ring’s 
characterization of the original intent of the jury-trial right: “If the defendant preferred the 
common-sense judgment of the of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction 
of the single judge, he was to have it.”  536 U.S. at 609.   
 Moreover, there are reasons to view judicial nullification as more problematic than jury 
nullification from the standpoint of democratic legitimacy.  To be sure, in some jurisdictions 
(though not all), judges are elected and thus also have a measure of democratic legitimacy.  At the 
same time, one can readily discern a number of reasons why the democratic credentials of even an 
elected judge might be viewed as unsatisfactory: judges are drawn from only a very small subset of 
the community’s population (i.e., those with law degrees); elected judges are often intentionally 
shielded from the same level of democratic accountability as elected legislators (e.g., through 
longer terms in office, retention votes, and other special nonpartisan election processes); and, in the 
great run of routine cases, judges operate without any meaningful public scrutiny. 
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democratic legitimacy.  And, as Jones pointed out, the common-law tradition is 
that the jury is not merely a finder of facts, but also an applier of law to facts.117 
Thus, the Apprendi decisions do not necessarily contemplate that the jury’s role 
in sentencing will be limited to fact-finding, in the narrowest sense of the term, 
but may also extend to determining the applicability of more subjectively-defined 
sentence enhancements.118 On this view, Apprendi advances democratic values 
by channeling the discretionary authority that is subtly embedded in mandatory 
sentencing regimes away from judges and towards juries. 
 Note the complementary nature of these two considerations.  The more 
particularized and rule-like the sentencing regime, the greater will be the need for 
an equitable mechanism, like the jury’s “pious perjury,” in order to address 
unanticipated instances of undue severity.  As the sentencing regime grows more 
flexible and standard-like, the need for this form of law-correction will diminish, 
but, with an increase in the sentencer’s discretionary authority, concerns may 
grow as to the sentencer’s democratic legitimacy.  Either way, the jury may have 
a useful role to play alongside the legislature in helping to ensure that sentencing 
outcomes conform to public preferences.119 
117 Jones, 526 U.S. at 247. 
118 See Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Blakely, 17 FED. SENT’ING RPTR. 89, 92 (2004) 
(discussing uncertainty as to whether determinations involving “value judgments,” not just findings 
of historical fact, trigger jury trial right under Blakely).  For an argument that juries are better suited 
than judges to determine blameworthiness for sentencing purposes, see Robinson & Spellman, 
supra note 112, at 1146-47. 
119 In addition to the reasons suggested by the Apprendi decisions, there is at least one other reason 
to regard the sentencing jury as an institution that might further democratic values: the jury brings 
to bear local views, as against the preferences of a distant legislature that may represent a host of 
communities with quite different views.  The federal system offers particularly dramatic 
illustrations of the potential disconnects between the criminal justice preferences of a local 
community and a more encompassing polity, see, e.g., Michael M. O’Hear, National 
Uniformity/Local Uniformity, 87 IOWA L. REV. 721, 731 (2002) (“Perhaps most striking are the 
federal death penalty cases in states that do not authorize capital punishment.”), but the same issue 
can also arise at the state level, see, e.g., Michael M. O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 
VAND L. REV. 783, 860-61 (2004) (discussing wide variations in county-level support for 
California’s Proposition 36, which requires diversion of drug offenders from incarceration to 
treatment).  For an argument that local preferences should generally prevail, at least with respect to 
crime that occurs on a local scale, see Michael M. O’Hear, Localization and Transparency in 
Sentencing: Reflections on the New Early Disposition Departure, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 358, 360-63 
(2004).  More controversially, localization through the jury may also provide a vehicle for 
predominantly African-American communities to address racial disparities in the operation of the 
criminal justice system.  See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the 
Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L. J. 677, 679 (1995).  For a leading critique of Professor 
26 RECONSIDERING BORDENKIRCHER 
2. Containing State Power 
 The Apprendi decisions repeatedly claimed to protect individual liberty and 
contain state power.120 How so?  One possibility, of course, is that democratic 
control works to restrict state power.  That would imply, in the present context, a 
tendency for juries to sentence more leniently than judges, thereby diminishing 
the coercive power of the state.  Ring, for instance, suggested that defendants 
might prefer sentencing juries to “less sympathetic” judges.121 This is 
doubtlessly true in some cases, but democratic control does not guarantee 
generous outcomes.  Indeed, some empirical studies suggest that jury sentencing 
is often harsher than judicial sentencing.122 Thus, enhanced democratic control, 
in and of itself, would not seem the most effective way to limit state power.123 
But jury sentencing may serve to contain state power in another respect: as a 
sort of procedural tax on prosecutions, that is, a burden on limited state law 
enforcement resources that might diminish the number and intensity of 
prosecutions and give defendants greater leverage in plea negotiations.  Jury 
sentencing might be implemented in one of two ways, either as a proceeding that 
is distinct from and subsequent to the determination of guilt, or as a connected 
adjunct to the basic criminal trial.  If implemented through the former 
 
Butler’s proposal, see Andrew D. Leipold, The Dangers of Race-Based Jury Nullification, 44 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 109 (1996). 
 Even if one does not accept the view that juries are an effective medium for expressing public 
preferences, providing a more robust role for the jury may nonetheless serve the parallel end of 
enhancing public perception of democratic control.  Robinson & Spellman, supra note 112, at 
1148.  In other circumstances, the Court has recognized the importance of such perceptions.  See, 
e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (“[W]e spoke in Buckley of 
the perception of corruption inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions, as a 
source of concern almost equal to quid pro quo improbity.” (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
120 See, e.g., Jones, 526 U.S. at 246 (referring to jury as “the grand bulwark” of liberty); Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 477 (characterizing purpose of right to jury trial as “guard[ing] against a spirit of 
oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers”); Ring, 536 U.S. at 607 (“The founders of the 
American republic were not prepared to leave [criminal justice] to the State, which is why the jury-
trial guarantee was one of the least controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights.  It has never been 
efficient; but it has always been free.”). 
121 Ring, 536 U.S. at 609. 
122 See, e.g., Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State Study,
57 VAND. L. REV. 883, 898 (2004) (discussing jury sentencing in Kentucky). 
123 The goal of limiting state power is easier to square with a jury sentencing right to the extent that 
defendants can unilaterally choose the finder of fact, selecting judge or jury according to which is 
expected to be more sympathetic.  Some jurisdictions, however, require jury-trial waivers from 
both defendant and prosecutor.  See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34-36 (1965) (upholding 
constitutionality of federal rule to this effect). 
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mechanism, the procedural costs (relative to judicial sentencing) are obvious: a 
jury must be assembled,124 managed, instructed, and argued to, all with the 
enhanced formality that is attendant to jury, as opposed to bench, trials.125 If jury 
sentencing is simply folded into the trial on the merits, the whole process will be 
far more efficient, but this may not be appealing or practically feasible in a 
complex sentencing guidelines system, where sentencing may require fact-
finding on a dozen or more discrete factors beyond the elements of the offense.126 
Moreover, even if this latter approach is selected, there is still the problem of 
guilty plea cases, in which the Apprendi decisions may necessitate the 
impaneling of a sentencing jury where no jury would otherwise be required.127 
The procedural tax theory squares with how the Apprendi decisions 
described what they were doing.  There can be no question but that the decisions 
self-consciously rejected efficiency in favor of limited state power.  As Ring put 
it, “[The jury-trial guarantee] has never been efficient; but it has always been 
free.”128 The procedural tax theory would go just one step further: “Because the 
jury trial has never been efficient, it has always been free.” 
 The procedural tax theory also squares with the Court’s pairing of the jury-
trial right with the right to fact-finding beyond a reasonable doubt, which also 
protects individual liberty by imposing increased procedural burdens on 
prosecutors.  The rule in Apprendi, for instance, expressly linked the two rights: 
“[A]ny fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
 
124 In cases in which the defendant was convicted by a jury, the same jury might be reconvened for 
sentencing, which would save the not inconsiderable costs associated with jury selection.  Most 
cases, however, are resolved by guity plea; in such cases, jury sentencing might necessitate the 
selection of a jury that otherwise would not have been required.   
125 See Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 390 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (detailing reasons jury trial entails “far 
more prosecutorial work” than bench trial); Turner, supra note 114, at 109 (discussing procedural 
formalities that might have to be observed in sentencing proceedings under Blakely).  These costs 
may vary by jurisdiction, though, depending on how complex the jurisdiction’s sentencing scheme 
is and how the jury-trial rights are implemented.  See id. at 110 (noting relatively low costs of 
implementing Apprendi in Kansas). 
126 See Turner, supra note 114, at 108 (arguing that, “in many cases, bifurcation is indispensable to 
ensuring a fair trial” and noting that Kansas, when “Blakely-izing” its sentencing guidelines, “let 
judges determine on a case-by-case basis when bifurcation would be in the interest of justice”).   
127 To be sure, a plea agreement might include a waiver of jury rights as to sentencing; however, not 
all guilty pleas are rendered pursuant to an agreement, and (depending on the priorities and relative 
bargaining leverage of the parties) not all agreements need necessarily include a waiver of such 
rights.  But see id. at 110 (noting “double-waiver” requirement in some jurisdictions, which 
requires that sentencing jury right be waived if trial jury right is waived). 
128 536 U.S. at 607. 
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maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”129 
3. Fairness to Defendants 
 Finally, the Apprendi decisions also purport to enhance fairness to 
defendants.  Fairness, here, is used in the sense suggested by some BLE scholars: 
consistency of outcomes with even imperfectly rational expectations.130 Fairness 
to defendants would thus imply that there are no nasty surprises at the end of the 
sentencing process; to the extent that the system fosters sentencing expectations, 
the system should not disappoint those expectations.  Blakely, in particular, 
emphasized these considerations: 
Any evaluation of Apprendi’s “fairness” to criminal defendants must 
compare it with the regime it replaced, in which a defendant, with no 
warning in either his indictment or plea, would routinely see his 
maximum potential sentence balloon from as little as five years to as 
much as life imprisonment, based not on facts proved to his peers beyond 
a reasonable doubt, but on facts extracted after trial from a report 
compiled by a probation officer who the judge thinks more likely got it 
right than wrong.131 
The Apprendi decisions are thus presented as an effort to save defendants from 
nasty surprises delivered “without warning” at sentencing. 
D. Is It Really Just “Doctrinaire Formalism”? 
 The Apprendi Five may claim that they are advancing democratic, 
libertarian, and fairness values, but are they really?  Justice O’Connor, 
characterizing their handiwork as “doctrinaire formalism,” thinks otherwise.132 
Her contention, along with that of the other Apprendi dissenters, is that the 
Apprendi rule will be evaded, such that there will be no step forward as to the 
basic jury-trial values, but, if anything, a step back. The dissenters have focused 
on three potential forms of evasion: (1) legislative inversion of sentence 
enhancements (i.e., increasing standard sentences and converting aggravating 
factors into mitigating), (2) a return to discretionary sentencing, and (3) 
 
129 530 U.S. at 466 (emphasis added). 
130 Infra Part II.D.2. 
131 542 U.S. at 311-12. 
132 Id. at 321 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  O’Connor doubtlessly has in mind here the sort of rigid 
formalism that dominated American legal thinking a century ago and that was the subject of 
relentless attacks by the Legal Realists.  See Erik Luna, Gridland: An Allegorical Critique of 
Federal Sentencing, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 25, 89-93 (2005). 
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prosecutorial use of plea inducements to force defendants to surrender their jury 
rights at sentencing.  (A fourth type of evasion, expanded use of mandatory 
minimums, is discussed separately in the Conclusion.133) These evasion 
arguments, which mirror analogous concerns raised by the Bordenkircher and 
Goodwin majorities, are discussed in turn below.  I will show that there are at 
least plausible responses to each of these concerns, and that accordingly the 
Apprendi decisions cannot fairly be accused of indifference to consequences.  
Before reaching the evasion arguments, however, this Section begins with two 
prefatory considerations: a description of the real formalism of the Apprendi 
decisions and a summary of key principles of BLE that will aid our 
understanding of Apprendi’s consequentialism. 
1. Apprendi’s Formalism 
 There is at least one sense in which the Apprendi decisions are unabashedly 
formalist: rule structure.  Recall that the McMillan test, which was largely 
displaced by Apprendi and its progeny, employed a highly indeterminate 
standard, i.e., whether the tail (the sentencing factor) was wagging the dog (the 
underlying offense).  Blakely, in particular, heaped scorn on the test for its 
indeterminacy.134 The Apprendi bright-line rule was preferable for the more 
robust protection it provided for jury rights; it would be perverse, Blakely 
suggested, to adopt a discretionary test that effectively endowed judges with the 
authority to decide the scope of their own power relative to juries.135 
133 The form of evasion stands on a different footing than the other three because the Apprendi Five 
have no unified position on it; four would have closed the “loophole” in Harris, while Justice 
Scalia (without explanation) provided the key fifth vote to keep it open.  Supra Part II.B.  Thus, 
discussion of this form of evasion would not contribute much to the immediate objective of teasing 
out the shared values and assumptions of the Five. 
134 542 U.S. at 312 n.13. 
135 542 U.S. at 308 (“Whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates this manipulable [McMillan]
standard rather than Apprendi’s bright-line rule depends on the plausibility of the claim that the 
Framers would have left definition of the scope of jury power up to judges’ intuitive sense of how 
far [in the legislative creation of new sentencing factors] is too far. We think that claim not 
plausible at all . . . .”).  A few state courts have recently reached the conclusion that Booker 
represented an implicit retreat from the bright-line rule of Apprendi and Blakely. See Jonathan D. 
Soglin & J. Bradley O’Connell, Blakely, Booker, & Black: Beyond the Bright Line, 18 FED.
SENT’ING RPTR. 46, 46 (discussing decisions by courts in California, Tennessee, and New Mexico).  
The Supreme Court has agreed to hear one of these cases, Cunningham v. California, with oral 
arguments scheduled in the fall of 2006.  Michael M. O’Hear, Cunningham: Why Federal 
Practitioners Should Pay Attention, 18 FED. SENT’ING RPTR. __ (2006).  While the recent addition 
of two new Justices may change the Court’s dynamic on Apprendi issues, a retreat from the bright-
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Adopting a formalist test, however, is not the same thing as “doctrinaire 
formalism,” which implies indifference to consequences.  Indeed, as Blakely 
suggested, one might adopt a bright-line rule specifically in order to produce 
more meaningful consequences.136 Underscoring this point, the Apprendi 
decisions repeatedly rejected arguments that the constitutional analysis should 
turn on statutory labels.137 As O’Connor herself recognized, these rejected tests 
were no less “bright-line” than the Apprendi rule.138 What drew the Apprendi 
Five to their rule was not merely its formalist character, but also its anticipated 
consequences.139 
2. Key Principles of Behavioral Law and Economics 
 A central insight of BLE is that “people evaluate outcomes based on the 
change they represent from an initial reference point, rather than based on the 
nature of the outcome itself.”140 This basic insight informs four salient, 
overlapping principles, each of which has been demonstrated in a host of 
empirical studies.  First, people tend to be loss-averse, i.e., “they weigh losses 
more heavily than gains of equal magnitude.”141 Second, while loss-avoidance 
may be preferred to gains, the concepts of “gain” and “loss” are malleable.142 
Thus, the framing of a transaction as a gain or a loss may play an important role 
in determining whether or not it is viewed as desirable.  Third, the starting point 
in a transaction tends to condition the outcome, even if the starting point is 
 
line rule approach—which was so ringingly endorsed in Blakely by five Justices who remain on the 
Roberts Court—would be surprising. 
136 See 542 U.S. at 308 (rejecting indeterminate standard as unlikely to prevent erosion of jury’s 
power). 
137 See, e.g., Apprendi¸ 530 U.S. at 494 (“The relevant inquiry is not one of form, but of effect . . . 
.”); Ring, 536 U.S. at 604 (“If Arizona prevailed on its . . . argument, Apprendi would be reduced to 
a meaningless and formalistic rule of statutory drafting.”). 
138 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 321 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
139 To be sure, the Apprendi decisions might be defended on the basis of other formalist values.  See 
King & Klein, supra note 15, at 1485 (arguing that Apprendi “maintains fidelity to historical 
practice and prior decisions”).  But see Bibas, supra note 15, at 196 (arguing that relevant history is 
unclear).  The point here is not that the Apprendi decisions would have come out differently if the 
Five had been oblivious to consequences, but, rather, that the decisions do plausibly purport to 
attend to consequences.  Indeed, despite frequent citations in the decisions to historical sources, I 
think Professor Bibas has it right when he argues that originalism was not the “driving force” 
behind the decisions.  Id. at 201. 
140 Jolls, et al., supra note 17, at 1535. 
141 Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2508 
(2004). 
142 Id. at 2512. 
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random or irrelevant.143 An initial reference effectively becomes an anchor, and 
“people usually do not adjust away from their anchors enough.”144 Thus, for 
instance, one study shows that “the asking price of a house strongly influences 
appraisals of its value, even for experts who consider the asking price completely 
uninformative and who have plenty of other information.”145 
Fourth, the losses that people try to avoid include not only material losses, 
but also losses to reputation and self-image.146 As a result of these 
considerations, human behavior often conforms to the principle of reciprocal 
fairness: people are willing to sacrifice their own material well-being to help 
those who are acting fairly, but are also willing to sacrifice so as to punish those 
who are acting unfairly.147 (Fairness, as suggested above, can be understood by 
reference to deviations from expectations; for instance, consumers will perceive 
as unfair a firm that takes advantage of the short-term scarcity of a good by 
increasing established prices.148) People, in other words, like to have a reputation 
for, and a self-image of, decency; but they also seek to avoid the appearance of 
being a dupe or a doormat.149 These tendencies can be observed empirically in 
experimental variations on the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma.150 
3. The Evasion Arguments 
 Having now identified some of the ways in which actual human behavior 
might differ from the model of homo economicus, let us consider how these 
principles might inform the debate over Apprendi’s consequentialism.  This 
debate largely revolves around three potential strategies for evading Apprendi.
a. Legislative Inversion 
 As Justice O’Connor observed, the Apprendi rule could, in principle, be 
defeated by a seemingly straightforward legislative reform: standard penalties 
could be increased, with maximum sentences then reduced based on the absence 
143 Id. at 2515. 
144 Id. at 2516. 
145 Id. (citing Gregory B. Northcraft & Margaret A. Neale, Experts, Amateurs, and Real Estate: An 
Anchoring-and-Adjustment Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions, 39 ORGANIZATIONAL 
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 84 (1987)) 
146 Jolls et al., supra note 17, at 1494. 
147 Id. at 1494 (citing Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness Into Game Theory and Economics,
83 AM. ECON. REV.1281 (1993). 
148 Id. at 1511-12. 
149 Id. at 1495. 
150 Id. at 1494. 
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of specified aggravating circumstances.151 In this inversion process, sentence 
“aggravators” would effectively be converted into “mitigators,” but, at least in 
principle, the same sentencing outcomes should be obtained—and without a need 
ever to impanel a sentencing jury.  (Recall that the Apprendi rule only requires a 
jury when the maximum sentence is increased beyond the standard range for the 
offense.)  If legislatures were, in fact, to respond to Apprendi by systematically 
inverting their sentencing regimes, then O’Connor’s charge of doctrinaire 
formalism might have some appeal: the inverted regimes, still relying on judicial 
fact-finding, would do nothing to advance Apprendi’s purported objectives of 
democratic control and limited state power.152 
In Apprendi, however, Justice Stevens repeated the response he made to this 
argument in McMillan, characterizing the likelihood of inversion as “remote.”153 
He relied on “democratic constraints” that would “discourage legislatures from 
enacting penal statutes that exposed every defendant convicted of, for example, 
weapons possession, to a maximum sentence exceeding that which is, in the 
legislature’s judgment, generally proportional to the crime.”154 Stevens, in other 
words, doubted that politically sensitive legislators operating in the real world 
would actually do as the dissenters predicted.155 
Why should this be so?  Why would voters find any more objectionable a 
high-to-low than a low-to-high sentencing scheme?  To use the facts of Apprendi 
itself as an example, why would voters support a ten-year maximum for a simple 
firearms possession offense with a possible additional ten years if there were 
racial bias, but oppose a standard twenty-year maximum for the firearms offense 
with a reduction to ten years in the absence of racial bias?  In principle, the 
 
151 O’Connor put it this way in Apprendi:
New Jersey could cure its sentencing scheme, and achieve virtually the same results, by 
drafting its weapons possession statute in the following manner: First, New Jersey could 
prescribe, in the weapon possession statute itself, a range of 5 to 20 years’ imprisonment 
for one who commits that criminal offense.  Second, New Jersey could provide that a 
defendant convicted under the statute whom a judge finds, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, not to have acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual on the basis of race 
may receive a sentence no greater than 10 years’ imprisonment. 
530 U.S. at 541-42 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
152 On the other hand, inversion might advance the third objective, fairness to defendants, inasmuch 
as an increase in the standard maximum sentence might diminish the likelihood of defendants 
receiving a nasty surprise at sentencing. 
153 530 U.S. at 466 n.16. 
154 Id. 
155 In case this were not enough, the Apprendi Court also reserved some “wiggle room” for itself to 
deal with inversion through constitutional adjudication.  Chanenson, supra note 62, at 415. 
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consequences of both laws should be the same.156 Yet, there is something 
intuitively plausible in Stevens’s claim that voters will perceive the two laws 
quite differently, and, indeed, precisely as Stevens predicted, legislatures have 
not rushed to adopt top-down schemes in the wake of Apprendi.157 
While not fully articulated, Stevens’s intuition must rest on assumptions of 
cognitive bias.158 In order to see why, we first need to consider what it is that 
legislators want from sentencing law.  In his influential work on the politics of 
criminal law, Professor Stuntz has identified two key objectives: (1) ensuring 
conviction and punishment of people “who commit the kinds of offenses that 
voters fear,” and (2) taking symbolic stands against the latest crime dominating 
the headlines159 (the proverbial “offense du jour”).  Legislators, however, do not 
want indiscriminate across-the-board sentence increases.  For one thing, they 
must recognize that voters do not necessarily support severe sentences for low-
level criminals.160 For another, sentence increases cost money, and legislators (at 
the state level at least) must be mindful of fiscal pressures.161 Indeed, if 
 
156 On the margins, a few cases might come out differently based on the different allocation of the 
burden of proof.  It seems unlikely, however, that a technical legal difference of this nature would 
engender the sort of dramatically different voter response that Stevens contemplated. 
157 The states most affected by the Apprendi line of cases have instead either engrafted jury fact-
finding onto their presumptive sentencing regimes, converted from presumptive to discretionary, or 
ignored the problem.  Stemen & Wilhelm, supra note 64, at 8-9. 
158 The “democratic constraints” argument has been subject to much criticism on the ground that, 
among other things, it rests on the implausible assumption that voters understand statutory maxima 
but not sentence enhancements.  See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence 
Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1137 (2001).  I offer here an 
original defense of Stevens’s hypothesis that does not rest on the assumption that voters have a 
patchwork knowledge of how sentencing works, but, rather, on the assumption that voters and 
legislators evaluate what they “know” in ways that are shaped by framing and anchoring effects. 
159 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICHIGAN L. REV. 505, 530-
32 (2001). 
160 See Vincent Schiraldi & Judith Greene, Reducing Correctional Costs in an Era of Tightening 
Budgets and Shifting Public Opinion, 14 FED. SENT’ING RPTR. 332, 332-33 (2002) (summarizing 
evidence of recent softening in public attitudes towards sentencing and growing interest in 
rehabilitative alternatives for nonviolent criminals).  In light of recent public corruption 
prosecutions, there may also be a measure of self-interest on the part of legislators in avoiding 
indiscriminate sentence increases.  For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Craig S. Lerner, 
Legislators as the “American Criminal Class”: Why Congress (Sometimes) Protects the Rights of 
Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 603-04 (2004). 
161 See Ronald F. Wright, The Power of Bureaucracy in the Response to Blakely and Booker, 43 
HOUSTON L. REV. 389, 412-13 (2006) (arguing, based on record of state responses to Blakely and 
Booker, that state sentencing commissions can successfully influence legislative reforms with 
appeals to fiscal responsibility). 
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expenditures on incarcerating low-level criminals are too high, legislators may 
compromise their own future capacity to respond to new offenses du jour. 
 It is the undesirability of indiscriminate sentence increases that makes 
inversion so politically unattractive.  To be sure, in a world of rational actors, it 
would be easy to invert without causing a broad increase in sentence lengths.  
But two forms of cognitive bias, framing and anchoring, complicate matters.  
First, because aggravators are framed as losses for convicted defendants at 
sentencing, while mitigators are framed as benefits, legislators will find it 
unappealing to enact a new sentencing scheme that is rich in mitigators but poor 
in aggravators; doing so is likely to appear to the public as “soft on crime.”  
(What politician would tout her vote for reducing the sentences of criminals who 
don’t happen to be racists?)  Yet, without the simultaneous conversion of 
aggravators to mitigators, a broad increase in standard sentence ranges is likely to 
result in increased actual sentence lengths.   
 Second, research on anchoring effects teaches that starting points can 
condition outcomes, even if the starting points are irrelevant or arbitrary.  This 
suggests that, in practice, simple inversion of a sentencing system (even 
assuming full conversion of aggravators to mitigators) will not produce the same 
outcomes that were achieved pre-inversion; instead, the newly increased standard 
sentence that is triggered by a conviction, even though technically irrelevant to 
defendants who qualify for mitigated sentences, will likely push sentences up 
across the board.  This provides further support for Stevens’s intuition that 
legislatures will avoid the inversion option. 
 b. Discretionary Sentencing 
 If inversion is politically unappealing, a legislature might instead evade 
Apprendi by adopting a discretionary sentencing system.  Nothing in the 
Apprendi line of decisions casts doubt on the constitutionality of judicial fact-
finding in connection with the selection of a sentence within a broad range; 
indeed, Booker itself makes clear that a discretionary system employing advisory 
guidelines with judicial fact-finding is perfectly constitutional.162 Such a switch 
would plainly undermine the goal of democratic control, as well as lift the 
procedural tax on the exercise of state prosecutorial power. 
 Responding to this argument, Blakely suggested that the switch to discretion, 
like inversion, might prove to be more a theoretical than an actual concern, 
 
162 543 U.S. at 233 (“We have never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in 
imposing a sentence within a statutory range.”). 
35 RECONSIDERING BORDENKIRCHER 
noting that Kansas, the first state to modify its sentencing system as a result of 
Apprendi, had opted for jury fact-finding in lieu of judicial discretion.163 Still, 
the possibility that some states might abandon presumptive sentencing schemes 
was not dismissed out of hand, as inversion had been.  And the fact that the 
Booker remedy majority subsequently adopted this very approach for the federal 
system suggests that such dismissal would have been mistaken. 
 But the possibility of greater reliance on discretionary sentencing does not 
really undermine Apprendi’s aims as much as might first appear.  First, as the 
example of Kansas and other states suggest, the contemporary unpopularity of 
discretionary sentencing means that many presumptive jurisdictions will likely 
choose to remain presumptive (with the addition, of course, of jury fact-
finding).164 Even if democratic control is not uniformly advanced across the 
country, it will be in at least some jurisdictions.165 
Second, while a switch to discretion may lift the procedure tax, a system 
reformed along these lines may nonetheless offer greater constraints on state 
power than a mandatory system.  In a discretionary system, the judge may serve 
as a meaningful check on prosecutorial overreaching,166 while in a mandatory 
system the judge may be reduced to a much less significant “bean-counting” 
role.167 Prosecutors can dominate a mandatory system by controlling which 
sentence enhancements are sought and which grounds for leniency are supported 
or contested.168 While prosecutors certainly do not always use their power to 
obtain the longest possible sentence, there are good reasons to believe that 
prosecutors, by and large, tend to take a more favorable view of their own cases 
 
163 542 U.S. at 390-10. 
164 Additionally, some states, like Minnesota, have chosen to retain their presumptive systems 
because they have come to rely on the ability of presumptive sentencing to predict and control 
corrections resource needs.  Dale G. Parent & Richard S. Frase, Why Minnesota Will Weather 
Blakely’s Blast, 18 FED. SENT’ING RPTR. 12, 17 (2005). 
165 In addition to Kansas, at least six more states have recently adopted jury fact-finding for 
sentencing purposes in the wake of the Apprendi decisions.  Stemen & Wilhelm, supra note 64, at 
8.  At least two states have switched from mandatory to discretionary, while several others with 
mandatory systems that seem to violate Blakely have yet to respond.  Id. at 8-9. 
166 See Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1471, 
1474 (1993) (“Historically, the prosecutor’s extraordinary bargaining power over defendants was 
constrained by independent judicial sentencing.”). 
167 See id. at 1475 (“Judicial sentencing no longer limits prosecutorial power in federal courts.”); 
Kate Stith & José A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 
NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV. 1247, 1255 (1997) (“One judge has recently likened his role in 
sentencing to that of a ‘notary public’ . . . .”).  
168 O’Hear, supra note 16, at 808. 
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than do judges.169 And, indeed, federal judges, with their newly enhanced 
discretion, have been imposing a higher rate of sentences below guidelines-
mandated levels than pre-Booker.170 
Finally, Blakely argued for the fairness of a discretionary system relative to a 
mandatory one.171 Fairness, as BLE scholars suggest, should take into account 
baseline expectations, and a discretionary sentencing system will satisfy 
expectations insofar as it reliably results in a sentence within the maximum 
established by the conviction.  As Justice Scalia put it, “I think it not unfair to tell 
a prospective felon that if he commits his contemplated crime he is exposing 
himself to a jail sentence of 30 years—and that if, upon conviction, he gets 
anything less than that he may thank the mercy of a tenderhearted judge.”172 By 
contrast, the problem with a mandatory system is that it might, “with no 
warning,” result in a dramatically higher sentence than expected on the basis of 
the offense of conviction.173 
169 See Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive 
Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1590-91 (2006) (describing how cognitive bias helps to 
explain “the failure of prosecutors always to make just decisions”).  There are limits to this line of 
reasoning; as Professor Stuntz observes, “[M]ost of the judges are elected by the same voters who 
elect district attorneys.”  William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing 
Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2561 (2002).  Many judges, moreover, are former prosecutors or 
are otherwise philosophically inclined to give prosecutors the benefit of the doubt.  At the same 
time, it is important to recognize that democratic accountability is often structured quite 
differently—and less robustly—for judges than for prosecutors, supra note 116, and judges are 
largely protected from the sorts of case-specific cognitive bias described by Professor Burke.  
Judges’ separation from the institutional culture of law enforcement may also enhance their ability 
to take an appropriately skeptical view of some prosecutions.  See GARY T. LOWENTHAL, DOWN 
AND DIRTY JUSTICE: A CHILLING JOURNEY INTO THE DARK WORLD OF CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL 
COURTS 111 (2003) (describing anti-defendant culture within which prosecutors work). 
170 Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker: Advisory Guidelines in the Federal System, 43 
HOUSTON L. REV. 341, 350 (2006) For a more detailed argument in favor of judicial discretion at 
sentencing as a means of protecting individual liberty, see Luna, supra note 132, at 95-100. 
171 Supra text accompanying note 131. 
172 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
173 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 311-12.  The argument here is colorable, but admittedly not compelling on 
its face, for it assumes that defendant expectations in a discretionary system will be shaped by the 
maximum possible sentence.  It is possible, however, that in some cases the “anchor” will be a 
much smaller number, for instance, the sentencing prediction of the defendant’s lawyer, the 
recommendation made by the prosecutor, or a sentence recently imposed in a similar case.  Indeed, 
this is almost certain to be the case in a discretionary system with robust advisory guidelines, such 
as the post-Booker federal system.  If the anchor is low, then a defendant’s expectations may be as 
severely disappointed as in a mandatory system.  Cf. United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 
189, 197 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that judge need not give advance notice to defendant of intent to 
impose sentence above the federal guidelines’ advisory range).  Indeed, if a mandatory system 
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In sum, while I do not mean to argue that discretionary sentencing is 
necessarily better than mandatory, there are at least plausible reasons, taking into 
account libertarian and fairness values, to prefer a discretionary system over a 
mandatory system that uses judicial fact-finding.174 
c. Plea Bargaining 
 Given the option of discretionary sentencing, legislatures might or might not 
choose to give juries a more robust role to play in the sentencing process.  To 
whatever extent juries were formally made available, however, the Apprendi 
dissenters predicted that they would be seldom used: “[T]he greater expense 
attached to trials and their greater complexity, taken together in the context of an 
overworked criminal justice system, will likely mean, other things being equal, 
fewer trials and a greater reliance upon plea-bargaining—a system in which 
punishment is set not by judges or juries but by advocates acting under 
bargaining constraints.”175 Moreover, not only would Apprendi produce fewer 
trials, but, the dissenters argued, the resulting system would be less fair, in the 
sense that it would be less uniform.  Prosecutors would control the punishment 
by deciding which sentencing factors to charge and then bargain away.176 These 
prosecutorial processes, however, “lack transparency and too often mean 
nonuniform, sometimes arbitrary, sentencing practices.”177 
Since at least the time of Bordenkircher, increasing numbers of defendants 
have been surrendering their right to a jury trial on the basic issue of guilt or 
innocence,178 and there is no reason to doubt the assumption of the Apprendi 
dissenters that the right to a jury trial on sentencing factors will be treated any 
differently.  This does not necessarily mean, however, that Apprendi is a futile 
gesture.  Again, consider Apprendi’s three aims in turn. 
 First, while most defendants might trade away their Apprendi rights, that 
does not necessarily mean that all will.  Moreover, those defendants most likely 
 
operates in a transparent and predictable fashion, it may do an even better job of fulfilling 
expectations than a discretionary system.  A definitive resolution of the fairness question, then, 
depends on a number of uncertain empirical issues. 
174 Professor Huigens also defends discretionary systems as better able to achieve “fine-
grainedness” in sentencing, which is “important for maintaining the moral credibility and public 
standing of the criminal justice system.”  Kyron Huigens, Solving the Williams Puzzle, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 1048, 1069 (2005). 
175 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 338 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
176 Id.
177 Id. at 345. 
178 See Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice,
154 U. PENN. L. REV. 79, 91 (2005) (showing long-term guilty plea trends in federal cases). 
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to insist on a jury trial will include those who most stubbornly believe that the 
application of a particular sentence enhancement sought by a prosecutor would 
be unjust.  It is precisely in these sorts of cases, in which there are legitimate 
disputes surrounding the application of a sentencing factor, that a jury might have 
the most to contribute as the voice of the community.  It is the hard cases in 
which democratic control is the most important in the implementation of 
sentencing enhancements, and Apprendi does at least ensure the availability of a 
jury in those cases.  As Blakely observed, “That more defendants elect to waive 
that right [to a jury] (because, for example, government at the moment is not 
particularly oppressive) does not prove that a constitutional provision 
guaranteeing availability of that option is disserved.”179 The flipside is that when 
government does act oppressively, as by seeking morally or legally dubious 
sentencing enhancements, the defendant may seek protection from his or her 
peers on the jury. 
Second, to the extent that defendants do bargain away their Apprendi rights, 
the procedural tax will indeed be lifted, but in a manner that is consistent with the 
goal of limiting state power, for defendants will likely receive concessions from 
prosecutors in the process.  “Every new element that a prosecutor can threaten to 
charge is also an element that a defendant can threaten to contest at trial and 
make the prosecutor prove beyond a reasonable doubt.”180 
Finally, we reach the nub of the dissenters’ objection to Apprendi, the 
fairness point.  A mandatory guidelines system that rests on jury fact-finding will 
leave prosecutors with gatekeeping authority over the application of sentencing 
enhancements, and prosecutors will not ensure uniform results across cases.181 
The Apprendi Five responded, however, that the system of “judicial” sentencing 
was plagued by its own uniformity problems: prosecutors had plenty of tools 
available to influence the sentence even in the world of judicial fact-finding, as 
 
179 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 312. 
180 Id. at 311.  While not all would agree with this proposition, see Bibas, supra note 15, at 198-99, 
Professors King and Klein have persuasively argued that the circumstances in which defendants 
would be worse off under Apprendi are narrow and unusual.  Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, 
Apprendi and Plea Bargaining, 54 STAN. L. REV. 295, 306-07 (2001). 
181 Note that the same uniformity concerns might be raised as to discretionary sentencing systems.  
It is important, however, to recall that discretionary sentencing can be implemented in a variety of 
ways other than through the traditional system of completely unguided discretion.  Such alternative 
approaches may, in fact, be effective in achieving uniformity goals.  See Hunt & Connelly, supra 
note 62, at 235 (discussing higher compliance rates with advisory guidelines in some states than 
with presumptive guidelines in other states). 
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by making sentencing recommendations.182 Such tools could easily be used as 
bargaining chips, thereby creating the same sorts of problems of prosecutor-
created disparity that the dissenters feared would arise post-Apprendi.183 
More fundamentally, though, there was the issue of perceived unfairness 
discussed above: in the world of judicial fact-finding, “a defendant, with no 
warning in either his indictment or plea, would routinely see his maximum 
potential sentence balloon from as little as five years to as much as life 
imprisonment.”184 Note the very different views of what constitutes fairness 
from the perspective of the dissenters (whose objective is the “systematic 
fairness” of consistent results across the run of cases185) and the majority (who 
concentrate on the perceptions of individual defendant in light of the expectations 
established by earlier proceedings in their own cases).  Seen through the latter 
lens, the Apprendi canon can indeed be viewed as providing a fairness benefit to 
defendants, even in the absence of a greater number of jury trials. 
 d. Summary 
 The Apprendi Five repeatedly rejected the charge of doctrinaire formalism 
and instead asserted that they were advancing democratic, libertarian, and 
fairness values in a meaningful way.  One does not have to agree fully with all of 
their contentions to acknowledge that they could, in good faith, lay claim the 
consequentialist high ground.  In any event, what is important for present 
purposes is not whether the Five ultimately had the better of the argument with 
the dissenters, but what the Five should think of Bordenkircher, assuming that 
they really meant what they said in the Apprendi decisions. 
 The Five expected that their decisions would cause some jurisdictions to 
enhance judicial discretion and others to create a formal role for juries in the 
sentencing process.  Their alignment in the Booker remedy opinions suggests that 
one of the Five (Justice Ginsburg) preferred the discretion option, while the other 
four preferred the jury option.  In any event, they plainly viewed both options as 
 
182 542 U.S. at 311. 
183 This is one among several reasons why I have argued that the dissenters greatly overstated the 
uniformity in federal sentencing prior to Booker. Michael M. O’Hear, The Myth of Uniformity, 17 
FED. SENT’ING RPTR. 249 (2005). 
184 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 311. 
185 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 339 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Interestingly, while the dissenters framed the 
uniformity issue as one of abstract, system-wide fairness, they might have reframed the issue in 
ways that were more in line with the majority’s subjective understanding of fairness: sentencing 
reformers in the 1970’s and 1980’s frequently argued that sentencing disparities were a source of 
great unhappiness among prisoners.  O’Hear, supra note 16, at 760, 772-73. 
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constitutionally acceptable and preferable to the pre-Apprendi world of sentence 
enhancements triggered by judicial fact-finding. 
 Finally, Apprendi’s consequentialism seems influenced by the view that (as 
BLE scholars put it) “people evaluate outcomes based on the change they 
represent from an initial reference point, rather than based on the nature of the 
outcome itself.”186 This insight helps to explain Apprendi’s dismissal of the 
inversion argument, as well as the contrasting definitions of fairness employed by 
the majority and dissenters.  For this reason, we might usefully think about 
Apprendi’s consequentialism as “biased-actor” consequentialism, differentiating 
it from a “rational-actor” consequentialism that predicts and evaluates 
consequences on the traditional homo economicus model, in which people think 
about outcomes without regard to the path by which the outcomes are reached. 
III. INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN APPRENDI AND BORDENKIRCHER 
This Part elaborates on the inconsistencies between the Apprendi decisions 
and Bordenkircher. These inconsistencies have two dimensions: (1) the relative 
value ascribed to bureaucratic efficiency in the criminal justice system, and (2) 
the use of rational-actor assumptions. 
A.  Common Law Values Versus Bureaucratic Efficiency 
 The Apprendi decisions were not framed as narrowly addressed to technical 
questions of law, but rather purported to select one “paradigm of criminal 
justice” over another: “the common-law ideal of limited state power” over “the 
civil-law ideal of administrative perfection,”187 the “common-sense judgment” of 
the jury over the “more tutored” judgment of the legal professionals.188 
Bordenkircher also reflected an underlying choice of paradigms, but the 
paradigm chosen was the one that lost in the Apprendi cases.  The Bordenkircher 
Court concluded that guilty pleas were an “important[] component of this 
country’s criminal justice system”189; characterized its prior decisions as not 
merely tolerating, but “encouraging,” the inducement of pleas190; and indicated 
that its “acceptance of the basic legitimacy” of the practice necessitated 
deference to the prosecutor’s choice of tactics.191 Bordenkircher’s vision of 
unconstrained plea-inducement is profoundly at odds with Apprendi’s paradigm.  
 
186 Jolls, et al., supra note 17, at 1535. 
187 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313. 
188 Ring, 536 U.S. at 609. 
189 Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 362 (citation omitted). 
190 Id. at 364. 
191 Id. at 363-64. 
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It is a system dominated by legal professionals, with no room for the “common-
sense judgment” of jurors.  While the system may boast considerable speed and 
efficiency, the Apprendi decisions repeatedly rejected the centrality of these 
virtues.192 
To be sure, the Apprendi Five did not anticipate that their decisions would 
turn back the clock to a time when jury trials were the norm in the criminal 
justice system.193 But they suggested that, even in the absence of common-law 
practices, the Constitution should be interpreted so as to safeguard common-law 
values, most notably, the value of maintaining a robust check on the ability of 
prosecutors to impose disproportionate punishments on an arbitrary or vindictive 
basis.  The repeated reference in the Apprendi decisions to the common-law 
tradition of pious perjury is telling. 
 Heavy-handed charging threats, a la Bordenkircher, embody contempt for the 
common-law values of checks and balances in the criminal justice system.  They 
send defendants a message that only the prosecutor’s view of the case counts, and 
that the system accords little actual value to their formal rights to be heard.194 
Moreover, the inconsistencies between Apprendi and Bordenkircher go beyond 
such symbolic considerations.195 If prosecutors have a free hand to raise the 
 
192 See, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. at 607 (“It has never been efficient; but it has always been free.”).  As 
the Apprendi decisions suggest, efficiency did not become a central preoccupation of the criminal 
justice until well after the framing of the Sixth Amendment.  See Nancy Jean King, Priceless 
Process: Nonnegotiable Features of Criminal Litigation, 47 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 113, 121-23 (1999) 
(describing emergence of efficiency concerns in late 1800’s and early 1900’s). 
193 See King, supra note 192, at 119-20 (“Courts of the nineteenth century would have ridiculed the 
idea that an accused and a prosecutor could dicker over what kind of break the defendant deserves 
for waiving a piece of the criminal process.”). 
194 Professors Scott and Stuntz have a wonderful analogy for Bordenkircher that nicely captures 
this aspect of the prosecutor’s actions: 
The . . . analogy is . . . the lone gas station in the middle of the desert that charges fifty 
dollars for a gallon of gas.  Like the prosecutor in Bordenkircher, the gas station usually 
gets its asking price, because the difference between that price and the cost of going 
without (death in the desert) is so high. . . . Imagine, however, that the gas station owner 
goes further.  Figuring that the buyer will kick and scream and haggle for an hour, but 
will eventually agree to the seller’s price, the seller decides to cut the negotiation short by 
letting the air out of the buyer’s tires and offering to refill the tires if, but only if, the 
buyer pays the seller’s asking price for gas. 
Scott & Stuntz, supra note 12, at 1964.  
195 As a growing body of social psychology research suggests, however, symbolism itself can play 
an important role in the ability of the criminal justice system to achieve its objective of enhancing 
public compliance with the mandates of the law and legal institutions.  See, e.g., Larry Heuer, 
What’s Just About the Criminal Justice System? A Psychological Perspective, 13 J. L. & POL’Y
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stakes in a jury trial as high as they wish, then only the most impetuous 
defendants will dare to invoke the protection from government overreaching that 
is potentially afforded by a jury.  The availability of the jury is thereby 
effectively curtailed.  And those who dare resist the pressure, like Paul Hayes, 
may pay an extraordinary price for doing so. Ironically, those who ask a jury to 
determine whether the government is overreaching may thereby assure that they 
become victims of overreaching. 
 One response to all of this, of course, is that, however troubling charging 
threats might be, it is futile to regulate them.  Prosecutors will simply file more 
aggressive initial charges, switching from “threats” to “offers,” with equally 
coercive effects.  This argument, analogous to the inversion argument made by 
the Apprendi dissenters, is considered in the next Section. 
 B. Biased Actors Versus Rational Actors 
 Bordenkircher’s consequentialism parallels that of the Apprendi dissenters.  
This becomes most apparent by reconsidering a portion of Justice Blackmun’s 
dissent in Bordenkircher, specifically, his response to the majority’s view that 
regulating the low-to-high strategy would merely cause prosecutors to switch to 
the seemingly equivalent high-to-low approach.  Blackmun identified three 
reasons why high-to-low was actually preferable to low-to-high.  These three 
reasons resonate with the thinking behind the Apprendi decisions and indicate 
why the Apprendi Five should find Bordenkircher’s analysis unpersuasive. 
 First, Blackmun argued, under the high-to-low approach,  
the prosecutor is required to reach a charging decision without any 
knowledge of the particular defendant’s willingness to plead guilty; 
hence the defendant who truly believes himself to be innocent, and 
wishes for that reason to go to trial, is not likely to be subject to quite 
such a devastating gamble since the prosecutor has fixed the incentives 
for the average case.196 
209, 226 (2005) (“Fair treatment enhances satisfaction with the criminal justice system and 
improves perceptions of the legitimacy of the law and of the authorities who enforce it. . . . 
Perceptions of fair treatment are heavily influenced by symbolic criteria, such as politeness and 
respect.”); TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION 
WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 83-84 (2002) (discussing study showing that people’s views of 
procedural justice are heavily influenced by such considerations as whether decisionmakers are 
polite and show concern for people’s rights).   
196 Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 368 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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The reasoning here parallels Stevens’s argument in Apprendi that legislatures 
won’t really increase penalties across the board and convert aggravators into 
mitigators: both arguments assume a subtle, practical check on the ability of 
politically responsive state actors to inflate penalties—even if the inflated 
penalties merely operate, at a formal level, as a starting point in the analysis.   
 In a world of unbounded rationality, it is not clear why a prosecutor going 
from high to low would base her initial charge on the “average case,” rather than 
charging the legally permissible maximum.197 In a world of cognitive bias, 
however, a number of justifications for the practice are apparent.  The 
prosecutor’s selection of a disproportionately serious charge may have powerful 
anchoring effects.  The prosecutor may appreciate the difficulty that she would 
have in moving a great distance down from the initial charge, and avoid gross 
overcharging on that basis; she will understand that if she cannot move far 
enough down from the initial charge, she risks wrecking the plea negotiations.198 
Moreover, an eventual conviction of a disproportionately high charge, whether 
by trial or plea, may be undesirable in and of itself, as the prosecutor may fear the 
exhaustion of limited criminal justice resources on relatively minor cases or an 
adverse public reaction to undue prosecutorial harshness.199 
197 To be sure, ethical standards for prosecutors prohibit using charges “only as a leverage device in 
obtaining guilty pleas to lesser charges.”  NAT’L DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASS’N, NATIONAL 
PROSECUTION STANDARDS 130 (2d.ed. 1991).  Such standards, however, are not enforceable.  See 
id. at 5 (noting that standards not intended to be basis for sanctions).  Our present concern, 
moreover, is not with prosecutors who rigorously adhere to the standards, but with prosecutors who 
already use the threat of enhanced charges to obtain plea bargaining leverage, and the extent to 
which they would simply switch to a different leveraging tactic if prohibited from using threats.  
198 As BLE scholars have observed, people in a variety of contexts recognize and take steps to 
address the boundedness of their willpower, as by joining “Christmas Clubs” in order to avoid 
undersaving.  Jolls et al., supra note 17, at 1479.  
199 Prosecutors do not always seek the harshest sentence available in every case; indeed, there is 
ample evidence that prosecutors will sometimes even act so as to subvert mandatory sentencing 
guidelines in order achieve what they believe to be a more appropriate set of sentences.  See, e.g., 
Frank O. Bowman, III, & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical Analysis of Declining 
Federal Drug Sentences Including Data From the District Level, 87 IOWA L. REV. 477, 559 (2002) 
(“Our work demonstrates that prosecutors . . . use their discretion liberally, but irregularly, to 
reduce drug sentences.”).  See generally Stuntz, supra note 169, at 2554 (“Once the defendant’s 
sentence has reached the level the prosecutor prefers—or, if you like, the level that the local voters 
who elect her boss demand—adding more time offers no benefit to the prosecutor. . . . Voters’ 
preferences, courthouse customs, the prosecutor’s reputation as a tough or lenient bargainer, her 
own views about what is a proper sentence for the crime in question—all these things play a role in 
defining the sentences that prosecutors are likely to seek in plea bargains.”).  See also id. at 2257 
(“[W]ho bears the blame if something goes wrong—if sympathetic defendants are punished or if 
unsympathetic defendants are punished more harshly than the public thinks just?  In the United 
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Adding weight to the anchoring effects, there are also framing effects.  
Movement up in charges will be seen by the public as a loss for defendants, but 
movement down represents a win.  In light of tough-on-crime political pressures, 
the prosecutor will want to be careful about routinely handing out big wins to 
defendants.  This consideration, too, would militate against indiscriminately 
maximizing initial charges; it is better to set initial charges with some modesty so 
that defendants will usually get only small wins in plea negotiations.200 
Finally, there is the principle of reciprocal fairness: a prosecutor who 
significantly overcharges risks being perceived as unfair by opposing counsel, 
which may prompt spiteful responses that make the prosecutor’s life more 
difficult, such as more filing of pretrial motions.201 Similarly, unfair 
overcharging may leave some defendants feeling more reluctant to plead guilty 
or otherwise cooperate with prosecutors.  In short, Blackmun’s assumptions 
about prosecutorial charging restraint seem at least plausible in a world of 
bounded rationality and willpower. 
 Second, Blackmun reasoned,  
It is healthful to keep charging practices visible to the general public, so 
that political bodies can judge whether the policy being followed is a fair 
one.  Visibility is enhanced if the prosecutor is required to lay his cards 
on the table with an indictment of public record at the beginning of the 
bargaining process, rather than making use of unrecorded verbal 
warnings of more serious indictments yet to come.202 
This argument, like the first, also rests on an assumption of prosecutorial restraint 
in determining the initial charges.  Consider an example: a defendant is initially 
charged with second-degree murder, but, pursuant to an agreement, ultimately 
 
States, the answer is almost always the overzealous prosecutor, not the overcriminalizing or 
oversentencing legislator.”). 
200 Not only may prosecutors arouse a negative public reaction by handing out big wins, but they 
may also run into difficulties in having their plea deals approved by judges.  See King, supra note 
192, at 136 (noting that all jurisdictions judges retain authority to review and reject plea deals).  For 
an example, see Dan Christensen, Florida Judge Complains U.S. Prosecutor Is “Weak-Kneed”,
MIAMI DAILY BUSINESS REV., March 18, 2004, available at,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1079144426509 (discussing case in which judge threatened 
to reject plea deal in which prosecutor agreed to dismiss two felony drug distribution counts in 
return for guilty plea to one misdemeanor possession charge). 
201 For a discussion of social science research on spiteful responses to perceived unfairness, see 
Jolls et al., supra note 17, at 1494-96.  
202 Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 368 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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pleads guilty only to reckless endangerment.  What is the public to make of this 
deal?  At first blush, it appears that the prosecutor paid a high price for the 
defendant’s guilty plea.  In the world of the Bordenkircher majority, however, 
the initial murder charge may have been far more than the prosecutor actually 
thought appropriate, a massive overcharge intended to ensure that only the most 
impetuous defendant would actually go to trial.  In the dissenters’ world, 
however, prosecutors act in a more restrained fashion, only overcharging to the 
relatively modest extent necessary to secure a guilty plea from the average 
defendant.  In the dissenters’ world, the public can more confidently conclude 
that the prosecutor has indeed moved a long distance from what she initially 
judged to be an appropriate disposition of the case. 
 Third, Blackmun asserted, “I would question whether it is fair to pressure 
defendants to plead guilty by threat of reindictment on an enhanced charge for 
the same conduct when the defendant has no way of knowing whether the 
prosecutor would indeed be entitled to bring him to trial on the enhanced 
charge.”203 The objection, of course, is that defendants always bargain in the face 
of uncertain trial outcomes204; it is not clear why the modest additional layer of 
uncertainty in Bordenkircher should be accorded particular significance.   
 Blackmun is nonetheless onto something by raising fairness concerns.  A 
threat is perceived differently than a offer: the former is framed as a loss, and the 
latter as a gain.  Powerful loss-aversion instincts may lend considerably greater 
coercive power to a threat than a offer.  BLE scholars have shown that people 
will go to irrational extremes in order to avoid a loss,205 which ought to raise 
concerns about whether guilty pleas are as well-considered when made in 
response to a threat as they are when made in response to an offer.206 The 
defendant, moreover, is likely at least to perceive himself treated less fairly in the 
threat scenario: his expectations are shaped by the charges initially filed, but then 
 
203 Id.
204 See Bibas, supra note 141, at 2493-96 (discussing information deficits that plague plea 
negotiations). 
205 Id. at 2508.  Defense lawyers might, in principle, serve as debiasers for their clients, but, as 
Professor Bibas has observed, “[L]awyers vary widely in their knowledge, skill, and incentives to 
debias their clients.”  Id. at 2520. 
206 See Wright, supra note 178, at 84 (arguing that declining federal acquittal rates demonstrate that 
prosecutors have accumulated too much power to extract guilty pleas from defendants who might 
otherwise win acquittals at trial).  A number of recent police misconduct scandals provide further 
anecdotal evidence that even innocent defendants will some times take plea deals in order to avoid 
the risks of going to trial.  .  Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.
2295, 2305 (2006). 
46 RECONSIDERING BORDENKIRCHER 
the prosecutor suddenly brings the possibility of much worse losses into view.207 
This echoes Blakely’s fairness objections to charging a defendant in a way that 
indicates one particular maximum penalty, then punishing him in a way that far 
exceeds the maximum.208 
In sum, the Apprendi Five should not find the Bordenkircher evasion 
argument any more persuasive than they found the evasion arguments made by 
the Apprendi dissenters.  There are good reasons to doubt that regulation of 
charging threats would result in dramatic inflation of initial charges.  And, even 
to the extent that some inflation does occur, there may nonetheless be reasons to 
view high-to-low charging as preferable to low-to-high.  High-to-low is more 
transparent to the public, and is likely perceived by defendants as less coercive 
and unfair. 
 
207 In contrast to the bait-and-switch character of low-to-high charging, high-to-low negotiations 
are not necessarily as crass as they are sometimes imagined.  See Gerard E. Lynch, Screening 
Versus Bargaining: What Exactly Are We Trading Off?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1399, 1403 (2003) 
(“Most plea negotiations, in fact, are primarily discussions of the merits of the case, in which 
defense attorneys point out legal, evidentiary, or practical weaknesses in the prosecutor’s case, or 
mitigating circumstances that merit mercy, and argue based on these considerations that the 
defendant is entitled to a more lenient disposition than that originally proposed by the prosecutor’s 
charge.”).  But cf. Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 1409, 1413-14 (2003) (asserting the Lynch’s description of plea bargaining, while 
perhaps accurate as to the federal system, does not match the reality of state court practice); 
MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE 
ATTORNEYS 41 (1977, paperback ed. 1981) (finding within single state system substantial 
differences in length of plea discussions and thoroughness with which facts of case were covered). 
208 This approach, which focuses on changes to baseline expectations, also resonates with the 
abundant philosophical literature on coercion.  See Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary 
Confession Rule: Toward a Workable Test for Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CAL. L. 
REV. 465, 525-26, 530 (2005) (summarizing literature); George C. Thomas III, A Philosophical 
Account of Coerced Self-Incrimination, 5 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 79, 86 (1993) (“[A] proposal is a 
threat only when it makes [a person’s] condition worse; and it is an offer when it makes [a person’s 
condition] better.”); ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 136 (1987) (discussing difficulty of 
determining baseline in plea-inducement context).  This literature identifies three ways of 
determining the baseline: empirical (i.e., what is statistically likely to occur absent the proposal), 
phenomenological (i.e., what is subjectively expected to occur absent the proposal), and normative 
(i.e., what is expected assuming compliance with moral norms).  Thomas, supra, at 87-88.  
Assuming that charges are not usually enhanced after they are formally made, and that defendants 
do not expect them to be enhanced, then a Bordenkircher-style proposal would amount to a threat 
in light of either the empirical or the phenomenological baseline.  (And if different baselines 
produce different results, then the right baseline to use would be one that reflects the defendant’s 
preference as to the future.  Id. at 89.)  Assuming that the prosecutor intends to deliver a threat and 
that the threat actually causes the defendant to plead guilty, then the chief conditions of coercion 
have been satisfied.  See id. at 83 (outlining basic conditions of coercion).   
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IV. DESIGNING A NEW RULE FOR CHARGING THREATS 
The previous Part demonstrated why the Apprendi Five should reject 
Bordenkircher. Assume now that the Court actually grants certiorari in a new 
case that presents a similar fact pattern, with a prosecutor delivering on a threat 
of new charges following a break-down in plea negotiations.  This Part considers 
how the Five might address a hypothetical Bordenkircher II.209 Section A 
discusses potential ways that a protective rule might be structured by the Court.  
Section B considers the possibility that Justice Stevens, the only holdover on the 
Court from the Bordenkircher majority, might defect from the Five in a 
hypothetical Bordenkircher II. Finally, Section C considers the consequences of 
the proposed rule in more detail, showing that the “doctrinaire formalism” charge 
would no more fairly apply in this context than in the Apprendi cases.  
A. Structural Options 
 Part I above described the contrasting protective rules proposed by the 
dissenters in Bordenkircher and Goodwin. This Section considers which of the 
rules would be most attractive to the Apprendi Five, concluding that Justice 
Brennan’s test squares nicely with the Apprendi model. 
1. Powell’s Wag-the-Dog Test 
 Justice Powell’s dissent in Bordenkircher suggested a case-by-case analysis 
of whether the trial penalty imposed by the prosecutor exceeded the State’s 
legitimate interests in punishing the defendant.  Powell’s test offers flexibility 
and, assuming the sort of generous understanding of the scope of the State’s 
interests suggested by Powell, only minimal intrusiveness by judges into the 
charging and plea-inducement process.  Indeed, Justice Stevens himself 
seemingly endorsed the Powell test in Goodwin.210 
More will be said about Stevens in the next Section, but, for now, note the 
basic jurisprudential inconsistency between Powell’s approach and the Apprendi 
decisions.  Powell’s test employs a standard, instead of a rule, in contrast to 
Apprendi’s preference for rule-structure formalism.  Powell’s approach, leaving 
wide discretion in the judiciary, offers little reassurance that jury-trial rights will 
not be progressively eroded, particularly given the institutional incentives for 
judges to support prosecutorial practices that result in more guilty pleas and 
 
209 While this Part is written with the possibility of a new United States Supreme Court case in 
mind, the proposal developed here might alternatively be adopted by state courts using their 
independent authority to construe due process rights under their own state constitutions. 
210 Supra Part I.B.2. 
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fewer trials.211 For that reason, the Apprendi Five are unlikely to unite behind a 
wag-the-dog test. 
2. Blackmun’s Actual Motivation Test 
 Blackmun’s dissent in Bordenkircher suggested a somewhat different 
approach: rather than focusing on the state’s interests in punishment, the inquiry 
should turn on the prosecutor’s actual motivation in bringing enhanced 
charges.212 Where a new charge is added after a break-down in plea negotiations, 
a burden-shifting analysis is triggered, requiring the prosecutor to justify her 
action on some non-vindictive basis.213 Blackmun seems to have contemplated 
something like the Batson test for racial discrimination in jury selection, which 
makes use of a similar burden-shifting approach en route to a determination of 
whether the prosecutor discriminated against a group of prospective jurors on 
account of their race.214 
The Batson analogy, however, demonstrates the basic objection to 
Blackmun’s approach.  Batson has proven notoriously ineffectual in practice.  
Prosecutors have little difficulty in providing race-neutral explanations for their 
peremptory strikes, and courts have little stomach for probing their actual 
motivations once a facially neutral explanation is offered.215 Likewise, one 
imagines that reasonably intelligent prosecutors will always be able to point to 
something that has changed in order to justify increased charges after the break-
down in plea negotiations: an investigator has come up with a new item of 
 
211 See Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 
1037-38 (2006) (arguing in favor of greater use of formalist rules to preserve separation of powers 
in criminal justice system); Stuntz, supra note 169, at 2561 (discussing evidence that judges “are 
invested in plea bargaining and try to facilitate it”).  Professor Stuntz has suggested a modified 
version of the wag-the-dog test, in which the government would be required to “point to some 
reasonable number of factually similar cases in which the threatened sentence had actually 
imposed, not just threatened.”  William J. Stuntz, Bordenkirch v. Hayes: Plea Bargaining and the 
Decline of the Rule of Law, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 351, 373 (Carol S. Steiker ed. 2006).  
This seems a move in the right direction, although, as Stuntz himself acknowledges, not all states 
collect the sort of data that would make the required showing possible.  Id. Additionally, the 
proposed requirement might still be overly indeterminate and deferential for the tastes of the 
Apprendi Five, leaving open the questions of what is a “reasonable number” and how to know 
when cases are sufficiently “factually similar” to count as suitable comparisons.    
212 See supra Part I.A.2. 
213 Id.
214 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
215 For a recent summary and critique of this Batson case law along these lines, see Antony Page, 
Batson’s Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping an the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 
166-78 (2005). 
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evidence, a victim’s injuries have taken longer than anticipated to heal, the 
prosecutor has just learned of a favorable appellate decision, etc.  Given the 
ephemeral nature of actual motives, the judge will have considerable “wiggle 
room” to find in favor of the prosecutor once such a neutral explanation is 
offered.  And, given the institutional incentives to support plea-bargained 
outcomes, one imagines that judges will liberally make use of this wiggle room, 
just as they have in the Batson context.  In short, Blackmun’s test offers hardly 
any firmer protection against the erosion of jury-trial rights than Powell’s wag-
the-dog test. 
3. Brennan’s Likelihood-of-Deterrence Test 
 Justice Brennan suggested a third approach in his Goodwin dissent.  Brennan 
would ask, “Did the elevation of the charges . . . pose a realistic likelihood of 
vindictiveness?  Is it possible that the fear of such vindictiveness may . . . deter a 
person in [the defendant’s] position from exercising his . . . right to a jury 
trial?”216 This test focuses neither on the propriety of the charge in the abstract 
(Powell’s test) nor on the prosecutor’s motive in bringing the charge 
(Blackmun’s), but on the deterrent effects of bringing the charge in the manner in 
which it was brought. 
 a. Adapting the Test to Charging Threats 
 Goodwin itself did not involve the specific low-to-high plea-bargaining issue 
presented by Bordenkircher, but it is not hard to imagine how Brennan would 
have applied his test in such circumstances.  Where a prosecutor threatens and 
then delivers an increased charge in response to a refusal to plead guilty, 
defendants will undoubtedly perceive vindictiveness, and there is at least a 
realistic likelihood that some will be deterred from exercising their procedural 
rights.  Brennan’s likelihood-of-deterrent-effects approach might thus be adapted 
to the Bordenkircher scenario through the following rule: The Due Process 
Clause is violated when, after a defendant has been indicted or otherwise 
formally charged, the prosecutor (a) makes a plea offer; (b) in connection with 
the offer, threatens to take an action that exposes the defendant to a longer 
maximum sentence than would otherwise be possible based on the existing 
charge(s); and (c) does take such an action following the defendant’s rejection of 
the offer. 
In light of the clarity of the rule, it should be easy for prosecutors to avoid 
running afoul of it.  If a prosecutor has a potential charge that he or she would 
 
216 Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 389-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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like to use as a bargaining chip, then the prosecutor has two choices: either (1) 
convey the terms of the proposed deal prior to the formalization of charges in an 
indictment or information, or (2) include the charge in the indictment or 
information.  Once post-charging plea negotiations begin, the charge might still 
be added—but only until there is an express threat relating to the charge, at 
which time the prosecutor would lose the ability to add the charge.  (And even at 
that point, the prosecutor would still be able to employ any other form of plea-
inducement that did not increase the defendant’s overall sentencing exposure, for 
instance, a promise to stand silent at sentencing.)  In order to maintain flexibility 
in modifying charges, prosecutors would thus have a strong incentive never to 
make the post-charging threat. 
 Using the rule, a defendant’s proof of vindictiveness in the Bordenkircher-
type setting would turn on a handful of objective facts, which should not involve 
protracted collateral litigation or undue intrusion into the inner workings of the 
prosecutor’s office.  To be sure, the rule, as framed here, contains a few legal 
ambiguities whose resolution I will leave for another day.217 Yet, the presence of 
such legal questions does not render the rule any less bright-line than the 
Apprendi test—which has also raised its fair share of legal questions. 
 b. Consistency With Apprendi (and Other Precedent) 
 The Apprendi Five should find the proposed rule preferable not only to the 
open-ended permissiveness of Bordenkircher, but also to the Blackmun or 
Powell approaches.  The structure of this rule echoes the formalism of Apprendi,
avoiding ephemeral considerations, such as state interests and prosecutorial 
intent, in favor of more objective fact-finding.  Moreover, like the Apprendi test, 
the proposed test focuses squarely on the fairness of the process to which the 
defendant was subject, without regard to the fairness of the outcome as an 
abstract proposition.218 Finally, like the Apprendi rule (as clarified in Harris), the 
proposed test makes the maximum available sentence the touchstone of the 
analysis; it constitutes a baseline against which subsequent changes are assessed.  
 
217 For instance, it would be too easy for prosecutors to evade the rule if they were narrowly 
prohibited from bringing only a specific charge that was expressly mentioned in a threat.  How 
much broader should the prohibition extend, though?  To all charges that would satisfy the Double 
Jeopardy “same elements” test?  Or more broadly to all transactionally related charges?  Likewise, 
should an analog to the Double Jeopardy Dual Sovereignty Doctrine apply in this context?  And 
what about charging threats that do not increase the potential maximum prison term (the standard 
metric for punishment severity), but that instead increase sentencing exposure in other respects, 
such as by triggering a forfeiture statute that would not otherwise be applicable? 
218 For instance, the Apprendi Court nowhere asked whether twelve years was, in the abstract, a just 
sentence for the defendant’s crime. 
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This test, in short, is what the Court should adopt in our hypothetical 
Bordenkircher II. 
 Interestingly, parallels to this rule can be found in other areas of criminal 
procedure law.  Consider, for instance, the Court’s decisions regarding a 
defendant’s invocation of his right to remain silent at trial: the Court’s protective 
rule prohibits the imposition of any penalty on the defendant for exercising the 
right, without regard to such subjective matters as severity or state of mind.219 
Griffin v. California offers a classic example.220 During closing arguments, the 
prosecutor urged the jury to draw a negative inference against the defendant 
because the defendant refused to testify.221 The Court subsequently found the 
argument unconstitutional, observing that an adverse comment on the refusal to 
testify “is a penalty . . . for exercising a constitutional privilege.  It cuts down the 
privilege by making its assertion costly.”222 Likewise, the proposed 
Bordenkircher II test prohibits prosecutor-imposed penalties that make assertion 
of the jury-trial right “costly.”   
 That said, the approach advocated here is concededly in tension with two 
other lines of cases: the pre-Bordenkircher line of cases that approve of plea-
inducements, and Goodwin and its progeny.  Neither set of cases, however, must 
necessarily be overturned.  Blakely indicates that plea-inducements are not 
inconsistent with “common-law values” as long as juries are at least available as 
a meaningful check on government over-reaching.  In this spirit, the proposed 
test does not target plea inducements generally, but only a particular form of plea 
inducement that raises especially strong coercion and fairness concerns.  As to 
Goodwin and its progeny,223 the proposed test does indeed jettison Goodwin’s 
system of presumptions and burden-shifting, but only in a narrow set of 
circumstances; otherwise, the Goodwin test still applies.  The special carve-out 
might be justified based on the repeated assertions by the Apprendi Five that the 
jury-trial right, consistent with the Framers’ intent, requires particular vigilance 
to prevent its erosion.224 Moreover, the proposed rule targets a particular set of 
 
219 For a succinct discussion of the cases, see Godsey, supra note 208, at 492-95. 
220 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
221 Id. at 610-11. 
222 Id. at 614. 
223 See, e.g., Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989). 
224 See, e.g., Jones, 526 U.S. at 246-47.  Thus, the proposed rule might not encompass threats that 
are not directed to a waiver of the jury-trial right, for instance, if a prosecutor threatened enhanced 
charges solely in order to obtain a waiver of the right to appeal, to contest a sentence enhancement, 
or to contest civil remedies.  Likewise, charging threats directed to obtaining the defendant’s 
testimony against another person might not be included.  In practice, however, it is often impossible 
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circumstances in which there can be little doubt that the prosecutor’s purpose was 
to discourage exercise of the right, thereby rendering Goodwin’s intent-
determination inquiry superfluous. 
 This is not to say that the Five should necessarily avoid a broader 
reconsideration of the vindictiveness and plea-inducement case law, but, rather, 
to suggest that they can proceed incrementally, precisely as they have done in the 
Apprendi line of cases.  The charging-threat issue can be addressed through a 
narrow holding that leaves other precedent, besides Bordenkircher itself, intact. 
B. Should Stevens Adhere to Bordenkircher?
As the only member of the Apprendi Five who voted with the majority in 
Bordenkircher, Justice Stevens requires separate consideration.  Should he be 
willing to reconsider that vote today?  In fact, Stevens’s opinion for the Court in 
Goodwin suggests that his views are no longer wholly in sync with 
Bordenkircher.225 Where Bordenkircher suggested no limitation on plea 
inducements, Goodwin seemed to contemplate some sort of wag-the-dog 
limitation.  Moreover, the fact that Justice Powell (author of the wag-the-dog 
dissent in Bordenkircher) actually joined the Goodwin majority lends support to 
the view that the Court (and Stevens) had moved between the two opinions.   
 Assuming that Stevens does indeed agree with the propriety of regulating 
plea inducements, would he accept the (rule-structure) formalist test proposed 
 
to disentangle the various motives behind a charging threat; usually, the prosecutor seeks the 
defendant’s waiver of a bundle of rights together.  In order to make the proposed rule meaningful, it 
should encompass “mixed-motive” scenarios, in which a waiver of the jury trial is part of the 
package sought by the prosecutor. 
225 Indeed, Stevens actually seemed to move away from the most extreme reading of Bordenkircher 
the very next term with his dissent in Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978).  Corbitt 
challenged the constitutionality of a New Jersey statute that mandated life imprisonment for 
defendants convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, but permitted a lesser penalty for defendants 
who pled out.  Id. at 215.  In upholding the statute, the majority relied heavily on Bordenkircher.
Id. at 221-22.  Stevens, in dissent, conceded that the New Jersey statute served the same state 
interest as do plea inducements delivered by prosecutors, id. at 231 (Stevens, J., dissenting), but 
rejected the majority’s suggestion that the basic legitimacy of this interest shielded all state action 
in furtherance of it.  Rather, what made the New Jersey statute different than Bordenkircher-type 
threats was that the statute mandated “a different standard of punishment depending solely on 
whether or not a plea is entered.”  Id. at 232 (emphasis added).  By contrast, he assumed that 
prosecutors would consider “individual factors relevant to the particular case,” rather than making 
charging decisions based solely on the defendant’s plea.  Id. at 231-32.  Stevens seems to be 
anticipating Goodwin and backing away from Bordenkircher’s open-ended deference.  See 
Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 380 n.11 (“A charging decision does not levy an improper ‘penalty’ unless it 
results solely from the defendant’s exercise of a protected legal right . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
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here, or would he continue to prefer the wag-the-dog test of Goodwin? There are 
at least two good reasons to believe that Stevens would prefer the proposed test. 
 First, he embraced an analogous test in his McMillan dissent and the 
subsequent Apprendi cases.  Recall that, in McMillan, Stevens acknowledged that 
this test would be easy to circumvent in principle, but he responded by arguing 
that political realities would prevent circumvention in practice. As suggested in 
the previous Part, similar arguments might be made in response to concerns 
about the circumvention of a formalist rule restricting charging threats.   
 Second, in the years since Bordenkircher and Goodwin, the plea-inducement 
playing field has tilted dramatically in favor of prosecutors, creating much more 
compelling risks that defendants will be effectively coerced into surrendering 
their trial rights.  At the time Bordenkircher was decided, draconian sentencing 
statutes, like Kentucky’s Habitual Criminal Act, were comparatively rare.  
Indeed, Kentucky’s Act was actually softened not long after Paul Hayes’ 
sentencing.226 Subsequent decades have been a different story.  Foreshadowing 
the future direction of criminal law, Pennsylvania enacted the mandatory 
minimum statute at issue in McMillan in 1982227—the very year Stevens wrote 
his opinion in Goodwin. In the years immediately following Goodwin, Congress 
began its biennial ritual of adopting new mandatory minimums at the federal 
level.228 Many states followed suit, with the trend perhaps reaching its apex with 
the adoption of California’s notorious three-strikes law in 1994.229 The upshot is 
that prosecutors now routinely have the ability to make the sort of extreme 
charging threats used against Paul Hayes.  While the holding in Bordenkircher 
rested, in part, on the Court’s view that prosecution and defense “arguably 
possess relatively equal bargaining power,”230 such an assertion would be nearly 
laughable today.231 
226 Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 371 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
227 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81. 
228 See Sandra Guerra Thompson, The Booker Project: The Future of Federal Sentencing, 43 
HOUSTON L. REV. 269, 271 n.13 (summarizing important federal mandatory minimum statutes). 
229 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT 
IN CALIFORNIA ix (2001). 
230 Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 667. 
231 See, e.g., LOWENTHAL, supra note 169, at 112 (describing defense lawyers’ “bitter[ness]” 
regarding “tilt of the playing field”); Standen, supra note 166, at 1473-74 (“[P]rosecutors possess 
and have the incentive to exercise substantial power to overwhelm criminal defendants in the plea 
bargaining process.”). 
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Stevens has been an acute and concerned observer of these trends, and made 
note of them in his Apprendi and Booker opinions.  Indeed, in Booker, he framed 
the Apprendi line of cases this way: 
As enhancements became greater [after McMillan], the jury’s finding of the 
underlying crime became less significant.  And the enhancements became 
very serious indeed. . . . [T]he Court was faced with the issue of preserving 
an ancient guarantee under a new set of circumstances.232 
Similarly, this same “new set of circumstances” should cause also Stevens to 
consider the need for modifying prosecutorial vindictiveness law in order to 
preserve the same “ancient guarantee.”  Neither the open-ended permissiveness 
of Bordenkircher nor the nearly-as-deferential approach of Goodwin plausibly 
provide the sort of robust safeguard that Stevens later demanded in Apprendi.
C.  More “Doctrinaire Formalism?” 
 Would modifying Bordenkircher as proposed be anything more than an 
exercise in “doctrinaire formalism”?  In other words, would a post-Bordenkircher 
II world be any different than the present world, and, if so, would the changes be 
in any sense appealing ones?  The previous Part set forth the basic argument that, 
taking into account the underlying logic of the Apprendi decisions, the Court 
could indeed regulate charging threats in a meaningful manner.  With a specific 
proposal now on the table, this Section develops the earlier argument in a more 
detailed fashion. 
 We should begin with an account of current charging and plea-inducement 
practices.  Characterizing such practices is a difficult task, for every prosecutorial 
office has its own policies and culture, and many offices leave considerable 
discretion in the hands of the line prosecutor.  That said, one may hazard a few 
generalizations.  First, in run-of-the-mill cases, initial charging decisions are 
often made by prosecutors based chiefly on information and recommendations 
supplied by police officers, without a great deal of independent investigation, 
research, or deliberation.233 Thus, the prosecutor may have little information 
about, for instance, potential defenses in the case, witness credibility issues and 
 
232 Booker, 543 U.S. at 236-37. 
233 The rigor of prosecutorial charge-screening may vary considerably by jurisdiction.  Darryl K. 
Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 
CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1600 n.47 (2005).  For a description of the charging processes of the New 
Orleans District Attorney’s office, which devotes an extraordinary amount of resources and care to 
the initial charging decision, see Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining 
Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 62-63 (2002). 
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similar sources of litigation risk, and (other than criminal history) the background 
and character of the defendant.234 Second, given the broad scope and many 
overlapping provisions of contemporary criminal codes,235 as well as the low 
level of proof required to initiate a criminal case,236 the prosecutor will typically 
have a range of permissible charging options, which will expose the defendant to 
greater or lesser degrees of punishment.  Third, taking into account informational 
limitations and the need for later plea-inducement flexibility, initial charges are 
typically a bit harsher than what the prosecutor actually thinks would be the 
optimal resolution of the case.237 Fourth, the prosecutor will not typically pursue 
every conceivable charge in every case.238 Fifth, given that prosecutors, defense 
lawyers, and sometimes defendants themselves are repeat players in the system, 
prosecutors are usually (but not always) quite successful in setting an initial 
charge that permits enough downward movement to induce a plea while still 
producing a final result that lies within the range of what the prosecutor considers 
an appropriate response to the crime.  Sixth, in addition to modifying charges, the 
prosecutor typically has a range of additional means to induce pleas, which might 
include, for instance, the promise of a favorable sentencing recommendation, an 
offer to stipulate to particular sentencing factors, or an agreement not to pursue 
civil remedies.  Because such devices do not involve the formal filing of new 
charges and related transaction costs (arraignment, preliminary hearing, fresh 
 
234 See Schulhofer, supra note 12, at 1983 (discussing information asymmetry between prosecution 
and defense).  In some cases, prosecutors become actively involved in the investigative process.  In 
such cases, prosecutors are apt to have more information available, but may be less able to assess 
the information in unbiased manner.  Brown, supra note 233, at 1600.  Either way, the prosecutor 
may initiate criminal proceedings without a realistic sense of potential weaknesses in her case.  One 
notable exception may be in federal white-collar cases, in which defense lawyers “almost always 
actively attempt, from a very early stage, to influence the conclusions of the prosecutor.”  Gerard E. 
Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2126 (1998). 
235 See, e.g., LOWENTHAL, supra note 169, at 104-05 (describing charging options made possible by 
overlapping crime definitions in one case). 
236 See id. at  98 (discussing probable cause standard used for charging purposes). 
237 See Gazal-Ayal, supra note 206, at 2331 (discussing “safety margin” built into charging 
decisions).  Professor Alschuler has provided a helpful taxonomy of “overcharging,” which 
includes vertical overcharging (“charging a single offense at a higher level than the circumstances 
of the case seem to warrant”) and different forms of horizontal overcharging (e.g., charging a 
defendant with a separate offense for each criminal transaction in which he participated).  Albert 
W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 85-87 (1968). 
238 Charging restraint, however, varies among jurisdictions and by type of case.  See, e.g., 
LOWENTHAL, supra note 169, at 105 (describing policy of Maricopa County, Arizona, to charge 
most serious possible crime when gun was used).  To the extent that prosecutors already routinely 
charge the maximum in particular categories of cases, then concerns about prosecutors “upping the 
ante” in response to our hypothetical Bordenkircher II are moot. 
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discovery demands, and so forth), prosecutors will often find them preferable to 
the tactic of threatening enhanced charges.  And, finally, because plea deals can 
usually be reached quickly and easily within the standard high-to-low 
framework, plea-bargaining more frequently follows this pattern than the low-to-
high approach exemplified by Bordenkircher. (By “standard high-to-low,” I 
mean that initial charges build in some bargaining room, but do not encompass 
every conceivable crime that could be charged.  I will refer to the latter approach 
as “super high-to-low.”) 
 With these assumptions in mind, let us now consider potential prosecutorial 
responses to our hypothetical Bordenkircher II.239 
1. Option One: Do Nothing 
 Prosecutors might respond to our hypothetical holding in Bordenkircher II by
charging as they always have.  This, in fact, seems a likely response in many 
jurisdictions.  Not only is it consistent with the recognizable inertia of all social 
institutions, but it also reflects the fact that prosecutors are generally quite 
successful in setting initial charges in such a way as to induce a guilty plea.  
Given the range of plea-inducement tools otherwise available, prosecutors in 
many—perhaps most—jurisdictions are unlikely to miss the option of threatening 
more serious charges except in a small number of unusual cases.  For many 
prosecutors, the potential for these occasional cases will not justify the costs of 
developing a systematic response to Bordenkircher II.
To the extent that “do nothing” is the prosecutorial response of choice, the 
post-Bordenkircher II world would not look dramatically different than the 
present.  Most defendants would experience the criminal justice system precisely 
as they do now.  Some defendants, however, would be spared threats of enhanced 
charges.  In some of their cases, a plea deal will be reached anyway because the 
prosecutor is willing to make sufficient additional concessions to the defendant.  
In others, the upshot will be a trial that would not have otherwise occurred.  
Overall, the effects of Bordenkircher II would look like the effects that the 
Apprendi Five anticipated would flow from their earlier decisions: a few more 
trials and a bit more plea-bargaining leverage for some defendants.  While such 
 
239 While the proposed rule is not, technically, a ban on charge-threats during plea negotiations, I 
assume that prosecutors would treat the rule in that way.  Because defense counsel would recognize 
that charging threats were ineffectual, such threats would not carry much plea-inducement weight; 
therefore, prosecutors would have little incentive to make them.  Thus, while one potential 
drawback of the rule is that, once a charging threat was made, a prosecutor would be unable to 
adjust charges upward based even on legitimate reasons, such as newly discovered evidence, this 
should not be a serious problem in practice. 
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results are certainly not cost-free to society,240 they do seem consistent with the 
overarching vision of a more robust role for the jury, greater limitations on the 
coercive power of the state, and greater fairness, as perceived by defendants.241 
2. Option Two: Up the Ante Across the Board 
 The Bordenkircher and Goodwin majorities feared that prohibiting low-to-
high would simply cause prosecutors to switch to a more aggressive version of 
high-to-low, upping the ante across the board with tougher initial charges.  Recall 
that at present prosecutors do not always charge every conceivable crime in every 
case.  Were prosecutors broadly to adopt a “super high-to-low” strategy, then our 
hypothetical holding in Bordenkircher II could indeed be accused of perverse 
consequences.  At best, cases would simply be resolved on the same terms as 
they are now, albeit sometimes following a different path (high-to-low instead of 
the reverse).  At worst, many defendants might actually be harmed in a number 
of respects, such as by facing greater stigma and more onerous bail conditions as 
a result on the higher initial charges.242 
These concerns, however, should be greeted with some skepticism.  First, as 
suggested in the previous Subsection, there are good reasons to doubt whether 
prosecutors would assume the transaction costs of broad, systematic responses to 
Bordenkircher II, when prosecutors can generally reach comfortable results 
within the standard high-to-low framework.  Second, to the extent there is a 
systematic response, prosecutors will be wary of inflating initial charges across 
the board.  As discussed in the previous Part, inflating initial charges may make it 
much harder, in light of anchoring and framing effects, for prosecutors ultimately 
to reach negotiated outcomes that are satisfactory to them.  Moreover, in light of 
reciprocal fairness tendencies, prosecutors also risk a backlash of uncooperative 
behavior from defendants and defense counsel. 
 
240 See Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TULANE L. REV. 695, 704-05 (2001) 
(noting social benefits of plea bargains, including reduced costs and reduced time lag between the 
offense and the punishment, which benefits defendants subject to pretrial detention and potentially 
enhances deterrent effects). 
241 Even a small incremental increase in the number of trials may have great significance in a 
system like ours where trials have become exceedingly rare.  See Wright, supra note 178, at 83 
n.12 (2005) (noting that if acquittals become too rare, then “they cannot serve their market 
discipline function during plea negotiation”). 
242 The Court expressed precisely this concern in Goodwin. 457 U.S. at 380 n.10.  More onerous 
bail conditions are perhaps of special concern; they not only increase the likelihood of pretrial 
detention, but may also thereby shape the ultimate disposition of the case.  See Bibas, supra note 
141, at 2492-93 (noting that pretrial detention impairs the defendant’s ability to mount a defense 
and, in small cases, increases pressure on the defendant to take a plea deal quickly). 
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Finally, to the extent that prosecutors do choose to up the ante across the 
board, we should recognize that this will not necessarily represent an unmitigated 
loss for defendants.243 While upping the ante would produce a period of 
instability in criminal practice, there would ultimately be a new equilibrium in 
which judges (certainly) and the public (possibly) would be able to recognize that 
charges have been inflated and discount accordingly.  For instance, when judges 
recognize that today’s aggravated assault charge was yesterday’s simple assault, 
and today’s attempted murder yesterday’s aggravated assault, then judges will 
likely discount today’s bail conditions, at least to some extent, in order to account 
for the change.244 At the same time, for reasons discussed in the previous Part, 
even when high-to-low and low-to-high produce the same outcomes, there is 
good reason to believe that the two tactics are perceived differently by 
defendants.  Given the different ways that losses and gains are experienced, 
defendants might perceive high-to-low as fairer and less coercive.  Whatever 
costs defendants bear, those costs should be considered in light of the benefits of 
perceived gains in fairness.245
3. Option Three: Up the Ante Selectively 
 If prosecutors do not wish to bear the potential costs of upping the ante 
across they board, they might instead up the ante selectively, targeting categories 
of defendants who tend to be particularly resistant to conventional plea 
inducements within the standard high-to-low framework.  It is not entirely clear 
what categories these would be, but one is readily identifiable: defendants who 
believe themselves innocent, or otherwise likely to prevail at trial, are likely 
particularly resistant to standard plea inducements.  This tendency may be 
explained in light of framing effects and loss-aversion; whereas the knowingly 
 
243 Of course, there are likely some discrete categories of defendants (serious recidivists, gangsters, 
terrorists, and the like) against whom prosecutors are already filing all plausible charges, either for 
public relations purposes or out of a genuine desire to obtain the maximum possible sentence.  The 
prosecution of such defendants should be unchanged by Bordenkircher II; there was never any 
room for threatening them with higher charges, so losing the ability to make the threat cannot affect 
the plea-bargaining or litigation process. 
244 Anchoring effects, however, suggest that the discounting will not be complete. 
245 Enhanced perceptions of fairness may produce important long-term benefits for both the 
defendant and the community.  For instance, in an important body of theoretical and empirical 
work, Professor Tyler and various colleagues have identified a link between perceptions of fair 
treatment, beliefs in the legitimacy of legal institutions, and voluntary deference to the law and 
legal authorities.  See, e.g., TYLER & HO, supra note 195, at xiv-xv, 12.  Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 
408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972) (“[S]ociety has a further interest in treating the parolee with basic 
fairness: fair treatment in parole revocations will enhance the chance of rehabilitation by avoiding 
reactions to arbitrariness.”). 
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guilty defendant likely welcomes a standard plea deal as a gain, an “innocent” 
defendant will see the agreement to plead guilty to any charge as a loss. 
 In light of these considerations, prosecutors in a post-Bordenkircher II world 
would have more of an incentive to determine before the start of plea-bargaining 
which defendants have a real claim of innocence or other grounds for optimism.  
However, an early, thorough review of the merits of the case by the prosecutor 
would be a welcome development.246 For instance, BLE scholarship suggests 
that early review would help prosecutors better appreciate defendant perspectives 
before positions harden in the charging and negotiation process and thereby 
facilitate the declination or voluntary dismissal of inappropriate charges.247 
These benefits, however, might be offset by an unfortunate effect of closer 
prosecutorial scrutiny in the early stages of the case: aggressive prosecutors 
anxious to ensure adequate plea-inducement leverage might inflate the initial 
charges against defendants whose optimism is both strong and misplaced.248 In 
these circumstances, whatever negative consequences flow from the super high-
to-low tactic (e.g., tougher bail condition, greater stigma) might effectively be 
distributed on the basis of the sorts of circumstances that cause defendants to take 
an unjustifiably optimistic view of their situation, such as incompetent legal 
counsel, poor cognitive functioning, or simple inexperience with the criminal 
justice system—all circumstances unrelated to the actual severity of the crime.   
 While it is possible to identify some categories of defendants as to whom 
prosecutors may wish to inflate initial charges, note that prosecutors already have 
incentives to be unusually aggressive in charging these defendants.  At present, 
 
246 See Wright & Miller, supra note 233, at 95 (noting benefits of pre-charge screening by 
prosecutors). 
247 See Burke, supra note 169, at 1614-15 (“Because the theory of guilt triggers sources of 
cognitive bias, prosecutorial neutrality should be at its peak prior to the prosecutor’s charging 
decision . . . .”); Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and Administrative 
Rulemaking, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 602-620 (2002) (discussing empirical evidence supporting 
theory of cognitive consistency, which predicts tendency to hold on to beliefs in face of 
disconfirming evidence, particularly where there has been public commitment to belief).  A leading 
criticism of plea-bargaining is that it leads to the conviction of innocent defendants.  Gazal-Ayal, 
supra note 206, at 2297.  As Professor Gazal-Ayal has recently pointed out, the root cause of the 
problem is that the strength of plea inducements leave prosecutors with insufficient incentives to 
screen out weak cases at the charging stage.  Id. at 2298-99.  Any marginal decrease in the 
prosecutor’s plea-inducement leverage, as by restricting the use of charging threats, should result in 
some marginal increase in the incentives to screen better. 
248 Professor Schulhofer has also argued that, if prosecutors could overcome information barriers to 
determine which defendants truly believe themselves innocent, they would respond with a more 
aggressive approach to plea inducement.  Schulhofer, supra note 12, at 1984. 
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however, prosecutors may resist these incentives, knowing that they retain the 
ability to threaten increased charges if the usual plea inducements prove 
inadequate.  Our hypothetical holding in Bordenkircher II would cancel the 
insurance policy, leaving prosecutors somewhat more likely to adopt the super 
high-to-low strategy.  Such a change might indeed impose costs on some 
defendants.  Other groups of defendants, however, may benefit, particularly to 
the extent that closer pre-charging examination of cases leads prosecutors to 
decline the more dubious ones up front.  Moreover, as discussed in the previous 
Subsection, costs also need to be weighed in light of perceptions of greater 
fairness in a system that does not employ explicit threats in order to extract 
waivers of constitutional rights. 
4. Option Four: Engage in More Pre-Charge Bargaining 
 If a prosecutor fears the loss of a post-charging plea-inducement tool (the 
threat of higher charges), then another logical response would be to secure the 
plea agreement before filing charges.  At this point, charges are still inchoate, and 
defendants may not have any clear expectation of what they will be; it is 
accordingly difficult to speak in terms of a “threat to increase charges,” and our 
hypothetical Bordenkircher II rule would be inapplicable.   
 There are good reasons, however, to doubt that prosecutors would routinely 
conclude plea deals before filing charges.  For one thing, no right to counsel 
attaches before the initiation of adversary proceedings,249 and prosecutors will 
not relish the inefficiencies and potential misconduct claims arising from direct 
negotiation with an unrepresented lay defendant.250 For another, defendants held 
in custody are generally entitled to a probable cause determination within 48 
hours of arrest.251 There are obvious efficiency benefits to combining this 
determination with the arraignment process, but doing so may leave little time for 
the prosecutor to negotiate a pre-charge deal.  In light of these sorts of 
constraints, increased pre-charge bargaining seems most likely in two types of 
cases: (1) white-collar cases in which the defendant is capable of securing 
counsel prior to the initiation of adversary proceedings,252 and (2) routine, high-
 
249 United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984). 
250 See, e.g., Wright & Miller, supra note 233, at 78-79 (explaining absence of pre-charge 
bargaining in New Orleans based on lack of public defender availability between bail hearing and 
arraignment). 
251 County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991). 
252 See Lynch, supra note 234, at 2126 (discussing routine pre-indictment contact between 
prosecutors and defense counsel in white-collar cases). 
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volume cases for which prosecutors may develop standard, take-it-or-leave-it 
plea offers, such as those used by many United States Attorneys’ Offices for 
illegal reentry cases.253 
Increased pre-charge bargaining would not necessarily be either unfair to 
defendants or unwelcome as a matter of policy.  An early deal compresses the 
period of uncertainty faced by the defendant, and may lessen the likelihood that 
defendants will develop firm expectations as to how the case will be handled that 
are later dashed.  Additionally, because an early deal relieves the prosecutor of 
various procedural burdens, such as the need to obtain an indictment or show 
probable cause at a preliminary hearing, the prosecutor may be willing to pay a 
premium for the defendant’s agreement to plead guilty.254 While an early deal 
may mean that the defendant (or the prosecutor, for that matter) may lack 
important information that would later come to light, this cost may be offset by 
the benefit of negotiations that occur outside the shadow of the cognitive bias 
that arises when the prosecutor publicly commits to a particular set of charges 
and a particular theory of the case.255 Finally, to the extent that early plea deals 
reduce the transaction costs borne by prosecutors, judges, and public defenders, 
more resources will be available for other purposes (including the potential 
increase in trials resulting from a prohibition on threats of increased charges). 
5. Option Five: Do More Sentence-Bargaining 
 If prosecutors lose some flexibility in using their charging power for plea-
inducement purposes, some may respond with greater use of sentence-related 
inducements.256 Depending on the particulars of sentencing law and practice in 
the jurisdiction, such inducements may take any of a number of different forms.  
For instance, in order to induce a plea, a prosecutor may offer to stand silent at 
sentencing or to recommend a particular sentence that the defendant would view 
as a favorable outcome.  Alternatively, in some jurisdictions, a plea agreement 
may be made contingent on a specific sentence or sentencing range.257 Or, more 
modestly, a prosecutor might offer to stipulate to a specific sentencing factor, 
 
253 See O’Hear, supra note 16, at 789 (describing federal “early disposition” programs). 
254 For instance, in the federal early disposition programs, defendants receive a special “downward 
departure” under the federal sentencing guidelines.  Id.
255 See Stern, supra note 247, at 640-43 (providing justification based on cognitive consistency 
theory for analogous practice of “regulatory negotiation,” in which stakeholders negotiate over a 
proposed rule before rule is formally published). 
256 To be sure, charging-related inducements affect the ultimate sentence by triggering a particular 
statutory sentencing range.  By “sentence-related inducements,” I mean inducements that affect the 
selection of a sentence within that statutory range. 
257 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C). 
62 RECONSIDERING BORDENKIRCHER 
such as amount of drugs or mitigating role in the offense, or agree not to seek a 
sentence enhancement on the basis of a particular factor.  In all such forms of 
“sentence-bargaining,” the prosecutor makes an offer or threat relating to the 
selection of a specific sentence within the applicable statutory maximum. 
 Because sentence-bargaining is already common in many jurisdictions,258 and 
not a practicable alternative in others,259 it is far from clear that a ban on 
Bordenkircher-style threats would meaningfully increase frequency of the 
practice.  To the extent the practice increased, some defendants might prefer the 
change, which would potentially leave them with a perception of greater control 
over the sentencing process and greater certainty as to the outcome.  On the other 
hand, there is cause for legitimate concern over sentence-bargaining.  The 
practice diminishes the visibility, and hence accountability, of the sentencing 
process, and may lead to unwarranted sentencing disparities between similarly 
situated offenders.  Additionally, threats to seek sentence enhancements, even 
within a given statutory maximum, may be no less coercive and perceived as no 
less unfair than threats to seek an increased maximum.  It is not clear, then, that 
defendants would gain from a switch on the margins from Bordenkircher-style 
charge-bargaining to similar threat-based sentence-bargaining.  At the same time, 
there seems no compelling reason to conclude that a switch from charge threats 
to sentence threats would constitute a loss for defendants. 
6. Option Six: Make Implicit Threats 
 If prosecutors lose the ability to make express charging threats, then some 
might attempt to make implicit threats, as by routinely pursuing additional 
charges against defendants who refuse plea deals.  The prosecutor would hope to 
develop a reputation for this practice among defense lawyers, so that defendants 
would be routinely counseled to take the prosecutor’s offer.  This would be an 
 
258 See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 
NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1285 (1997) (estimating that plea bargaining results in circumvention of 
federal sentencing guidelines in 20 to 35 percent of cases). 
259 In jurisdictions without sentencing guidelines and with a strong tradition of judicial control of 
sentencing, for instance, the prosecutor’s sentencing-related bargaining chips will have little value.  
See KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL 
COURTS 80 (1998) (“[In the pre-guidelines federal system] in many districts . . . prosecutors 
generally refrained from rendering specific sentencing recommendations to the judge, and the judge 
would neither elicit nor condone such recommendations.”); Wright & Miller, supra note 233, at 79-
80 (describing absence of sentence bargaining in New Orleans); King, supra note 192, at 136 
(“Judges more readily reject sentence agreements than charge bargains, considering the selection of 
an appropriate sentence to be within their special domain . . . .”). 
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unfortunate practice, perhaps even worse than an express Bordenkircher-style 
threat, which at least has the virtue of giving the trial-bound defendant a clear 
opportunity to avoid the “threatened” charge. 
 There are some natural checks on this practice.  The transaction costs of new 
charges may deter some prosecutors from routine charge enhancements.  Others 
will avoid the practice because it offends their sense of fairness.  Still others will 
be reluctant to subvert a clearly articulated constitutional norm of no threats.   
 In order to buttress these tendencies, however, courts should be willing to 
entertain “implicit threat” claims from defendants who were subject to pretrial 
charge increases.  These claims might proceed along two lines.  First, the 
prosecutor might be required to provide a neutral explanation for the charge 
increase.  For reasons described in an earlier Section, however, this sort of 
requirement is not likely to provide a meaningful check on prosecutors.  Thus, 
defendants should be permitted to present evidence of past practices so as to 
establish a pattern of routine charge enhancements, either on the individual 
prosecutor level or the office level.  Unfortunately, there is no obvious line to be 
drawn here, and courts will not have an easy time deciding when the rate of 
charge enhancements reaches a level sufficient to demonstrate “a realistic 
likelihood of vindictiveness.”260 Just permitting the claims, however, may have a 
salutary effect, as prosecutors will doubtless wish to avoid coming close to the 
line and thereby prompting burdensome collateral litigation.261 Prosecutors could 
easily do so by exercising care in their initial charging decisions and making a 
habit of standing by those initial decisions.  (And, as indicated above, improved 
initial charging is both viable and desirable on a number of grounds.262)
7. Summary 
 In weighing the actual consequences of the hypothetical holding in 
Bordenkircher II, it may be helpful to distinguish among three categories of 
defendants: (1) those who would not have been subject in any event to 
Bordenkircher-style charging threats; (2) those who would have been subject to 
such threats and pled guilty; and (3) those who would have been subject to such 
 
260 See Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 223 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
261 I assume that the defendant would have to make some sort of minimal threshold showing in 
order to trigger full-blown litigation of the issue.  This showing should not, however, 
disingenuously require the defendant effectively to carry his burden on the merits before getting 
discovery, as the Court has unfortunately required in an analogous context.  See United States v. 
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996). 
262 See Wright & Miller, supra note 233, at 32-34 (arguing that early and careful assessment of 
cases is both viable and attractive). 
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threats and gone to trial.  Those in the first category will not likely be much 
affected by the holding.  There may be some adverse consequences on the 
margins to the extent that prosecutors respond by upping the initial charging ante.  
However, these effects are not likely to be profound or widespread, and may be 
offset by the benefits of, for instance, increased pre-charge investigation and 
bargaining. 
 Those in the second category will be spared charging threats.  Some will go 
to trial as a result.  Of these, some will win, and some will lose; and, of those 
who lose, some may actually be worse off, from a sentencing standpoint, than if 
they had taken advantage of the plea deal offered to them.263 Still, all who go to 
trial will have the advantage of a process they preferred to a bargained resolution, 
and all should perceive greater fairness than in a system that promises a right to a 
trial but expressly penalizes those who invoke it. 
 Some in the second category will opt, even in the absence of a charging 
threat, to plead guilty, perhaps as a result of sentencing threats, enhanced initial 
charges, or a simple failure of nerve.  On the whole, one imagines that these 
defendants will be better off insofar as Bordenkircher II removes one, sometimes 
quite powerful, device from the prosecutor’s plea-inducement toolbox.  While 
some defendants may suffer a net loss (e.g., by facing higher initial charges), 
there are good reasons to doubt that such results will be widespread; in general, a 
prosecutor’s loss of one source of plea-inducement leverage should strengthen, 
not weaken, the defendant’s negotiating position. 
 Those in the third category should most clearly benefit from Bordenkircher 
II. These defendants are bound for trial regardless of the prosecutor’s best efforts 
to the contrary; the only question is what charges they will face.  Under 
Bordenkircher II, those charges will often be less than they would have been 
under Bordenkircher I. To be sure, some will face the same charges they would 
have otherwise faced because the prosecutor will have upped the ante in the 
initial charges.  But, again, there are good reasons to doubt that such results will 
be universal.  Many category-three defendants will unambiguously benefit from 
Bordenkircher II, and few will unambiguously suffer.264 
263 The judge, for instance, may impose a “trial penalty” on the defendant at sentencing.  See, e.g., 
Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences After Guilty Plea, 
Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 961-62 (2005). 
264 Some category-three defendants may suffer a net loss if the prosecutor makes sentencing threats 
that the prosecutor would not have made if charging threats had been available, the defendant loses 
at trial, and the prosecutor’s delivery on the sentencing threats results in a longer sentence than 
would have otherwise been imposed.  One imagines, however, that these cases would be rare.  For 
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These defendants, moreover, are defendants for whom we should feel a 
particular solicitude.  By their determination to go to trial, the category-three 
defendants are likely signaling one or more of the following conditions: a firm 
belief in their innocence, unusual optimism regarding their chances of winning at 
trial, extraordinary bullheadedness, ineffective legal counsel, and/or an 
expectation that the results of a conviction will be especially onerous.  Under 
Bordenkricher I, as the dissenters in the case suggested,265 defendants are 
effectively penalized for these sorts of circumstances, even though they have no 
legitimate bearing on the defendants’ blameworthiness.  Indeed, if anything, the 
defendant’s firm belief in his own innocence should raise serious questions about 
the defendant’s culpability. 
 In sum, there are good reasons to believe that Bordenkircher II will have real 
effects on the outcomes of some cases; this is not a matter of “doctrinaire 
formalism” in the sense that any potential consequences of the holding will be 
swamped by prosecutorial circumvention.  Nor is it a matter of doctrinaire 
formalism in the perverse consequences sense.  While one must concede a 
likelihood that some defendants will suffer worse outcomes as a result of the 
holding, there are good reasons to doubt that these effects will be widespread.  
Other defendants should be unambiguously better off, and some of these are 
among the most vulnerable in the system. 
 There may also be broader, if more subtle, benefits.  The hypothetical 
holding in Bordenkircher II would provide prosecutors with additional incentives 
to do more investigation and negotiation before filing charges; this may promote 
more judicious charging decisions, more efficient negotiation and litigation 
processes, and reduced uncertainty for defendants and victims.  Bordenkircher II 
would also invite prosecutors to reconsider whether they overvalue the goal of 
speedy convictions, and perhaps contribute to stronger due process norms in 
connection with plea-inducement.  Finally, Bordenkircher II would signal 
defendants that the system takes constitutional rights seriously and that even 
prosecutors operate in a rule-bound fashion; this may strengthen respect for the 
system and promote compliance with the rules that the system lays down for 
defendants.266 
instance, it is not clear why a prosecutor who was willing to use charging threats under 
Bordenkircher I would withhold sentencing threats, on which the transaction costs of follow-
through are often less. 
265 Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 366 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
266 See supra note 245.  While this Article most directly addresses the Apprendi Five, the same 
considerations that would justify their overturning Bordenkircher would also justify experimental 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Apprendi’s critics can be forgiven for using the “doctrinaire formalism” 
label: there is a real gap in the Apprendi decisions between the rhetoric and the 
rule.  The decisions amount to incrementalism disguised as absolutism.  They 
give the appearance of absolutism because of their frequent invocation of a 
romantic ideal of the jury as a check on government oppression, because of their 
express rejection of efficiency and uniformity as legitimate grounds on which to 
limit access to juries, and because their legal test permits no prudential case-by-
case balancing of interests.  Yet, this apparent absolutism is an illusion.  The 
decisions allow, indeed expressly contemplate, both discretionary sentencing by 
judges and negotiated guilty pleas.  In a world in which these practices are 
allowed to persist, jury fact-finding for sentencing purposes will always be the 
exception, not the norm. 
 The Court’s failure to live up to its absolutist rhetoric does not necessarily 
mean that the Court is failing to advance the basic values embraced by the 
rhetoric.  And the Apprendi decisions do indeed provide for at least incremental 
progress.  The decisions limit the range of legislative options in structuring 
sentencing systems.  Denied their most preferred choice, many states will 
(indeed, many already have) adopt jury fact-finding.  And while many defendants 
will surrender their right to such fact-finding, not all will.  Apprendi and its 
progeny should therefore result in at least an incremental increase in the reliance 
on juries for sentencing purposes.  And in those cases in which defendants do 
bargain away their jury rights, they will often be able to obtain additional 
concessions in the process, thereby marginally diminishing prosecutorial 
domination of the system.  In jurisdictions that do not adopt jury fact-finding, the 
likely response will be discretionary sentencing.  While a switch to discretionary 
sentencing does not necessarily enhance democratic control, it also incrementally 
advances the ideal of checks and balances in the exercise of state power.  In 
short, while the Apprendi decisions do not require states to adopt sentencing 
systems that fully embody “common law values,” they at least steer states in the 
right direction. 
 In this Article, I have suggested how this type of incrementalism, in the 
service of the same underlying values, might lead to a new approach to the 
 
regulation of charging threats by state and local legislatures and executive authorities.  Such 
experiments would offer the ancillary benefit of empirical data to aid in the assessment of costs and 
benefits of different regulatory approaches.  Such data, in turn, may contribute to the elaboration or 
modification of the constitutional rule proposed here.  Cf. Booker, 543 U.S. at 237 (noting Court’s 
need to adjust to “new circumstances” in order to preserve jury-trial right). 
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regulation of Bordenkircher-style charging threats.  The goal here is not to steer 
legislatures in the right direction, but prosecutors.  In some cases, the 
prosecutor’s most preferred choice is to charge the defendant one way and then 
threaten enhanced charges in order to extract a guilty plea.  Denied the 
opportunity to do so, prosecutors may respond in any of a number of different 
ways, some considerably more attractive than others.  On the whole, though, 
there is good reason to believe that the rule proposed here will result in an 
incremental increase in the number of jury trials, an incremental decrease in the 
scope of prosecutorial domination, and an enhanced perception among 
defendants that the system operates in a fair, predictable, and respectful manner. 
 One drawback to incrementalism, of course, is that the line-drawing will 
always seem a bit arbitrary.  There is always an argument that some other 
increment best strikes the balance between protecting the right at issue, 
minimizing disruptions, and preserving flexibility.  While a number of such 
arguments may be made in the present context, one in particular stands out as 
requiring some commentary.  The most troubling limitation to the Court’s 
incrementalism in the Apprendi line of cases is the exception for mandatory 
minimums, as confirmed in Harris.267 For purposes of symmetry, I have, with 
some reluctance, incorporated the same exception into the proposed 
Bordenkircher II rule. 
 The Harris exception is unfortunate, but not such a gaping loophole as to 
wholly undermine the Apprendi rule.  While some jurisdictions may adopt more 
mandatory minimums, or convert sentencing guidelines into mandatory 
minimums, in response to the Apprendi decisions, not all jurisdictions have done 
so or (in light of prison budget concerns, if nothing else) are likely to do so.268 
Moreover, the Harris exception may be exploited only to the extent that the 
mandatory minimum lies within the statutory maximum.  The Harris exception 
thus carries its greatest significance in cases in which the offense of conviction 
provides a generous statutory maximum, but has much less room to operate in the 
context of less serious offenses.  For instance, in Bordenkircher itself, although 
the Habitual Criminal Act was framed as a mandatory minimum, it would not 
have escaped the proposed charging threats rule because the minimum (life) far 
exceeded the maximum for the underlying offense (ten years). 
 
267 See supra Part II.B. 
268 See Wright, supra note 161, at 408-09 (discussing reasons that states “have shown relative 
restraint when it comes to mandatory minimum sentences”).  Moreover, evasion efforts based on 
the conversion of guidelines into mandatory minimums may run into a number of serious 
constitutional objections.  Berman, Tweaking, supra note 170, at 360-62. 
68 RECONSIDERING BORDENKIRCHER 
That said, it would be preferable to reject the Harris exception in both the 
sentencing factor and the charging threats context.269 Indeed, this would not 
really be inconsistent with the views of the Apprendi Five, four of whom 
dissented in Harris, but only inconsistent with the views of Justice Scalia.  He 
should reconsider.270 The political constraints on the adoption of mandatory 
minimums are not nearly as reassuring as the political constraints on the adoption 
of inverted sentencing.  Mandatory minimums further empower prosecutors, 
especially when they can be triggered through the relaxed procedures available 
for “sentencing factors,” which is inconsistent with the checks-and-balances 
ideal.  And Blakely’s fairness objections to out-of-the-blue sentence 
enhancements seem no less compelling as to minimums than as to maximums. 
 The plea-inducement system—what Judge Lynch aptly terms “our 
administrative system of criminal justice”271—is likely with us for the long haul, 
and that is not necessarily a bad thing.  The challenge is to develop legal rules so 
as to bring some semblance of checks and balances to the system, to dispel the 
perception (and sometimes the reality) of momentous decisions about human 
liberty being dictated by prosecutors according to their own whims, biases, and 
personal convenience.272 With or without a mandatory minimum exception, 
overturning Bordenkircher would be a very good place to start. 
 
269 Fortunately, as other commentators have observed, in light of Justice Breyer’s reluctant 
concurrence in Harris and other recent developments, there is good reason to believe that the 
decision will not stand for long.  Id. at 359-60. 
270 Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604 (2003) (Scalia, J, dissenting) (noting obligation of 
judges to “carry things to their logical conclusion”). 
271 Lynch, supra note 234, at 2118. 
272 See O’Hear, supra note 16, at 805-811 (discussing unchecked prosecutorial discretion as a form 
of dignitary harm to defendants); Barkow, supra note 211, at 1050 (arguing that analysis of plea 
bargaining should focus more on balance of power issues). 
